PuDHammer: Experimental Analysis of Read Disturbance Effects of Processing-using-DRAM in Real DRAM Chips
Ismail Emir Yuksel, Akash Sood, Ataberk Olgun, Oguzhan Canpolat, Haocong Luo, Nisa Bostanci, Mohammad Sadrosadati, A. Giray Yaglikçi, Onur Mutlu
摘要
Processing-using-DRAM (PuD) is a promising paradigm for alleviating the data movement bottleneck using a DRAM array's massive internal parallelism and bandwidth to execute very wide data-parallel operations. Performing a PuD operation involves activating multiple DRAM rows in quick succession or simultaneously, i.e., multiple-row activation. Multiple-row activation is fundamentally different from conventional memory access patterns that activate one DRAM row at a time. However, repeatedly activating even one DRAM row (e.g., RowHammer) can induce bitflips in unaccessed DRAM rows because modern DRAM is subject to read disturbance, a worsening safety, security, and reliability issue. Unfortunately, no prior work investigates the effects of multiple-row activation, as commonly used by PuD operations, on DRAM read disturbance.
In this paper, we present the first characterization study of read disturbance effects of multiple-row activation-based PuD (which we call PuDHammer) using 316 real DDR4 DRAM chips from four major DRAM manufacturers. Our detailed characterization results covering various operational conditions and parameters (i.e., temperature, data patterns, access patterns, timing parameters, and spatial variation) show that 1) PuDHammer significantly exacerbates the read disturbance vulnerability, causing up to 158.58× reduction in the minimum hammer count required to induce the first bitflip (HC f irst ), compared to RowHammer, 2) PuDHammer is affected by various operational conditions and parameters, 3) combining RowHammer with PuDHammer is more effective than using RowHammer alone to induce read disturbance errors (e.g., compared to RowHammer, doing so reduces HC f irst by 1.66× on average across all tested rows), and 4) PuDHammer bypasses an in-DRAM RowHammer mitigation mechanism called Target Row Refresh and induces more bitflips than RowHammer.
To develop future robust PuD-enabled systems in the presence of PuDHammer, we 1) develop three countermeasures and 2) adapt and evaluate the effectiveness of state-of-the-art Row-Hammer mitigation standardized by industry, called Per Row Activation Counting (PRAC). We show that the adapted PRAC incurs large performance overheads to mitigate PuDHammer (e.g., an average performance overhead of 48.26% across 60 five-core multiprogrammed workloads). We hope and expect that our findings motivate and guide system-level and architectural solutions to enable read-disturbance-resilient future PuD systems.
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引用它的顶会 Paper5
- ColumnDisturb: Understanding Column-based Read Disturbance in Real DRAM Chips and Implications for Future SystemsIsmail Emir Yuksel, Ataberk Olgun, Nisa Bostanci, Haocong Luo 等MICRO 2025 · 被引用 15 次
- Understanding and Mitigating Covert Channel and Side Channel Vulnerabilities Introduced by RowHammer DefensesF. Nisa Bostanci, Oguzhan Canpolat, Ataberk Olgun, Ismail Emir Yüksel 等MICRO 2025 · 被引用 8 次
- DejaVu: Why You Should Write to Your DRAM Rows Twice, CarefullyHaocong Luo, Ismail Emir Yüksel, Ataberk Olgun, Nisa Bostanci 等ISCA 2026 · 被引用 4 次
- PuDghost: Experimental Analysis of Computation Result Corruption in Processing-Using-Dram Operations on Real Dram Chips and Implications for Future SystemsDaichi Tokuda, Ismail Emir Yüksel, Tatsuya Kubo, Ataberk Olgun 等ISCA 2026 · 被引用 4 次
- Conduit: Programmer-Transparent Near-Data Processing Using Multiple Compute-Capable Resources in Solid State DrivesRakesh Nadig, Vamanan Arulchelvan, Mayank Kabra, Harshita Gupta 等HPCA 2026 · 被引用 2 次
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