Protean: A Programmable Spectre Defense
Nicholas Mosier, Hamed Nemati, John C. Mitchell, Caroline Trippel
摘要
We present the PROTEAN Spectre defense—the first to be altogether comprehensive, covering all side-channels and speculation; programmer-transparent, requiring no source modifications; and programmable, tailoring its hardware protections to software's security needs. Several Spectre defenses offer the first two features, but protect a hardware-defined subset of architectural state from transiently leaking. Meanwhile, many Spectrevulnerable programs process secrets in ways that such rigid protections cannot both performantly and fully secure. Protean overcomes this limitation through: (1) ProtISA, an ISA extension that allows software to tell hardware which architectural registers and memory bytes require protection from transiently leaking at each program point; (2) ProtCC, a compiler that automatically infers and programs ProtISA protections for vulnerable code with minimal user input; and (3) ProtDelay and ProtTrack, two alternative hardware mechanisms that performantly enforce software-defined ProtISA protections. By flexibly tailoring a hardware Spectre defense to a program's data protection needs, Protean significantly reduces the overhead of fully securing vulnerable programs. With ProtDelay/ProtTrack, it averagesandof the runtime overhead of the best secure baseline for programs with and without mixed security needs, respectively, at lower/comparable hardware complexity.
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