SoK: Take a Deep Step into Linux Kernel Hardening Effectiveness from the Offensive-Defensive Perspective
Yinhao Hu, Pengyu Ding, Zhenpeng Lin, Dongliang Mu, Yuan Li
摘要
—Despite extensive efforts to harden the Linux ker-nel—the foundation powering numerous widely-used distributions (e.g., Ubuntu, Debian, Fedora)—it continues to face persistent and sophisticated memory safety vulnerabilities. In this study, we introduce a novel systematic framework that de-composes kernel exploitation into three distinct phases from an attacker’s perspective. Through comprehensive analysis of 121 publicly documented exploits since 2015, we identify and categorize 64 recurrent attack vectors. Leveraging this structured approach, we perform an in-depth evaluation of 51 existing kernel defense mechanisms, clearly mapping their coverage, limitations, redundancies, and interdependencies. Our results reveal significant protection gaps: 23 attack vectors remain entirely unprotected, and 31 existing defenses are bypassable or obsolete. Additionally, we uncover notable discrepancies between theoretical effectiveness and practical deployment across popular downstream distributions, highlighting 4 underutilized hardening measures and misconfigurations in four major distributions. By illuminating these critical gaps and offering actionable insights, our work guides both kernel developers and security practitioners in enhancing defensive strategies and refining future security designs.
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- SLAKE: Facilitating Slab Manipulation for Exploiting Vulnerabilities in the Linux KernelYueqi Chen, Xinyu XingCCS 2019 · 被引用 76 次
- KEPLER: Facilitating Control-flow Hijacking Primitive Evaluation for Linux Kernel VulnerabilitiesWei Wu, Yueqi Chen, Xinyu Xing, Wei ZouUSENIX Security 2019 · 被引用 75 次
- Unleashing Use-Before-Initialization Vulnerabilities in the Linux Kernel Using Targeted Stack SprayingKangjie Lu, Marie-Therese Walter, David Pfaff, Stefan Nümberger 等NDSS 2017 · 被引用 58 次
- Gollum: Modular and Greybox Exploit Generation for Heap Overflows in InterpretersSean Heelan, Tom Melham, Daniel KroeningCCS 2019 · 被引用 50 次
- CONFIRM: Evaluating Compatibility and Relevance of Control-flow Integrity Protections for Modern SoftwareXiaoyang Xu, Masoud Ghaffarinia, Wenhao Wang, Kevin W. Hamlen 等USENIX Security 2019 · 被引用 49 次
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