Compiler-Assisted Code Randomization
Hyungjoon Koo, Yaohui Chen, Long Lu, Vasileios P. Kemerlis, Michalis Polychronakis
摘要
Despite decades of research on software diversification, only address space layout randomization has seen widespread adoption. Code randomization, an effective defense against return-oriented programming exploits, has remained an academic exercise mainly due to i) the lack of a transparent and streamlined deployment model that does not disrupt existing software distribution norms, and ii) the inherent incompatibility of program variants with error reporting, whitelisting, patching, and other operations that rely on code uniformity. In this work we present compiler-assisted code randomization (CCR), a hybrid approach that relies on compiler-rewriter cooperation to enable fast and robust fine-grained code randomization on end-user systems, while maintaining compatibility with existing software distribution models. The main concept behind CCR is to augment binaries with a minimal set of transformationassisting metadata, which i) facilitate rapid fine-grained code transformation at installation or load time, and ii) form the basis for reversing any applied code transformation when needed, to maintain compatibility with existing mechanisms that rely on referencing the original code. We have implemented a prototype of this approach by extending the LLVM compiler toolchain, and developing a simple binary rewriter that leverages the embedded metadata to generate randomized variants using basic block reordering. The results of our experimental evaluation demonstrate the feasibility and practicality of CCR, as on average it incurs a modest file size increase of 11.46% and a negligible runtime overhead of 0.28%, while it is compatible with link-time optimization and control flow integrity.
问问这篇 Paper
智能体会读完全文。
Lune 把这篇 Paper 索引到了每一个公式,引用它的顶会 Paper 也一样。你提问,回答直接引用原文。
引用它的顶会 Paper13
- SoK: All You Ever Wanted to Know About x86/x64 Binary Disassembly But Were Afraid to AskChengbin Pang, Ruotong Yu, Yaohui Chen, Eric Koskinen 等S&P 2021 · 被引用 102 次
- xMP: Selective Memory Protection for Kernel and User SpaceSergej Proskurin, Marius Momeu, Seyedhamed Ghavamnia, Vasileios P. Kemerlis 等S&P 2020 · 被引用 89 次
- KEPLER: Facilitating Control-flow Hijacking Primitive Evaluation for Linux Kernel VulnerabilitiesWei Wu, Yueqi Chen, Xinyu Xing, Wei ZouUSENIX Security 2019 · 被引用 75 次
- Egalito: Layout-Agnostic Binary RecompilationDavid Williams-King, Hidenori Kobayashi, Kent Williams-King, Graham Patterson 等ASPLOS 2020 · 被引用 68 次
- Methodologies for Quantifying (Re-)randomization Security and Timing under JIT-ROPSalman Ahmed, Ya Xiao, Kevin Z. Snow, Gang Tan 等CCS 2020 · 被引用 21 次
它引用的顶会 Paper8
- TaintART: A Practical Multi-level Information-Flow Tracking System for Android RunTimeMingshen Sun, Tao Wei, John C. S. LuiCCS 2016 · 被引用 188 次
- An In-Depth Analysis of Disassembly on Full-Scale x86/x64 BinariesDennis Andriesse, Xi Chen, Victor van der Veen, Asia Slowinska 等USENIX Security 2016 · 被引用 162 次
- Ramblr: Making Reassembly Great AgainRuoyu Wang, Yan Shoshitaishvili, Antonio Bianchi, Aravind Machiry 等NDSS 2017 · 被引用 155 次
- Leakage-Resilient Layout Randomization for Mobile DevicesKjell Braden, Lucas Davi, Christopher Liebchen, Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi 等NDSS 2016 · 被引用 90 次
- Address Oblivious Code Reuse: On the Effectiveness of Leakage Resilient DiversityRobert Rudd, Richard Skowyra, David Bigelow, Veer Dedhia 等NDSS 2017 · 被引用 78 次
相关 Paper
- IMIX: In-Process Memory Isolation EXtensionTommaso Frassetto, Patrick Jauernig, Christopher Liebchen, Ahmad-Reza SadeghiUSENIX Security 2018 · 被引用 77 次
- What Cannot Be Read, Cannot Be Leveraged? Revisiting Assumptions of JIT-ROP DefensesGiorgi Maisuradze, Michael Backes, Christian RossowUSENIX Security 2016 · 被引用 41 次
- NORAX: Enabling Execute-Only Memory for COTS Binaries on AArch64Yaohui Chen, Dongli Zhang, Ruowen Wang, Rui Qiao 等S&P 2017 · 被引用 46 次
- Burn after reading: a shadow stack with microsecond-level runtime rerandomization for protecting return addressesChangwei Zou, Jingling XueICSE 2020 · 被引用 6 次
- Return to the Zombie Gadgets: Undermining Destructive Code Reads via Code Inference AttacksKevin Z. Snow, Roman Rogowski, Jan Werner, Hyungjoon Koo 等S&P 2016 · 被引用 54 次
