Evasion Attacks and Defenses on Smart Home Physical Event Verification
Muslum Ozgur Ozmen, Ruoyu Song, Habiba Farrukh, Z. Berkay Celik
摘要
—In smart homes, when an actuator’s state changes, it sends an event notification to the IoT hub to report this change (e.g., the door is unlocked). Prior works have shown that event notifications are vulnerable to spoofing and masking attacks. In event spoofing, an adversary reports to the IoT hub a fake event notification that did not physically occur. In event masking, an adversary suppresses the notification of an event that physically occurred. These attacks create inconsistencies between physical and cyber states of actuators, enabling an adversary to indirectly gain control over safety-critical devices by triggering IoT apps. To mitigate these attacks, event verification systems (EVS), or broadly IoT anomaly detection systems, leverage physical event fingerprints that describe the relations between events and their influence on sensor readings. However, smart homes have complex physical interactions between events and sensors that characterize the event fingerprints. Our study of the recent EVS, unfortunately, has revealed that they widely ignore such interactions, which enables an adversary to evade these systems and launch successful event spoofing and masking attacks without getting detected. In this paper, we first explore the evadable physical event fingerprints and show that an adversary can realize them to bypass the EVS given the same threat model. We develop two defenses, EVS software patching and sensor placement, with the interplay of physical modeling and formal analysis, to generate robust physical event fingerprints and demonstrate how they can be integrated into the EVS. We evaluate the effectiveness of our approach in two smart home settings that contain 12 actuators and 16 sensors when two different state-of-the-art EVS are deployed. Our experiments demonstrate that 71% of their physical fingerprints are vulnerable to evasion. By incorporating our approach, they build robust physical event fingerprints, and thus, properly mitigate
问问这篇 Paper
智能体会读完全文。
Lune 把这篇 Paper 索引到了每一个公式,引用它的顶会 Paper 也一样。你提问,回答直接引用原文。
引用它的顶会 Paper2
- One Key to Rule Them All: Secure Group Pairing for Heterogeneous IoT DevicesHabiba Farrukh, Muslum Ozgur Ozmen, Faik Kerem Örs, Z. Berkay CelikS&P 2023
- Discovering Adversarial Driving Maneuvers against Autonomous VehiclesRuoyu Song, Muslum Ozgur Ozmen, Hyungsub Kim, Raymond Muller 等USENIX Security 2023
它引用的顶会 Paper18
- Security Analysis of Emerging Smart Home ApplicationsEarlence Fernandes, Jaeyeon Jung, Atul PrakashS&P 2016 · 被引用 684 次
- Limiting the Impact of Stealthy Attacks on Industrial Control SystemsDavid I. Urbina, Jairo Alonso Giraldo, Alvaro A. Cárdenas, Nils Ole Tippenhauer 等CCS 2016 · 被引用 351 次
- IoTGuard: Dynamic Enforcement of Security and Safety Policy in Commodity IoTZ. Berkay Celik, Gang Tan, Patrick D. McDanielNDSS 2019 · 被引用 254 次
- CADE: Detecting and Explaining Concept Drift Samples for Security ApplicationsLimin Yang, Wenbo Guo, Qingying Hao, Arridhana Ciptadi 等USENIX Security 2021 · 被引用 241 次
- Fear and Logging in the Internet of ThingsQi Wang, Wajih Ul Hassan, Adam Bates, Carl A. GunterNDSS 2018 · 被引用 205 次
相关 Paper
- Peeves: Physical Event Verification in Smart HomesSimon Birnbach, Simon Eberz, Ivan MartinovicCCS 2019 · 被引用 74 次
- Discovering IoT Physical Channel VulnerabilitiesMuslum Ozgur Ozmen, Xuansong Li, Andrew Chu, Z. Berkay Celik 等CCS 2022 · 被引用 25 次
- Your Home is Insecure: Practical Attacks on Wireless Home Alarm SystemsTao Li, Dianqi Han, Jiawei Li, Ang Li 等INFOCOM 2021 · 被引用 7 次
- CP-IoT: A Cross-Platform Monitoring System for Smart HomeHai Lin, Chenglong Li, Jiahai Yang, Zhiliang Wang 等NDSS 2024
- IoTSafe: Enforcing Safety and Security Policy with Real IoT Physical Interaction DiscoveryWenbo Ding, Hongxin Hu, Long ChengNDSS 2021
