Cerberus: Query-driven Scalable Vulnerability Detection in OAuth Service Provider Implementations
Tamjid Al Rahat, Yu Feng, Yuan Tian
摘要
OAuth protocols have been widely adopted to simplify user authentication and service authorization for third-party applications. However, little effort has been devoted to automatically checking the security of the libraries that service providers widely use. In this paper, we formalize the OAuth specifications and security best practices, and design Cerberus, an automated static analyzer, to find logical flaws and identify vulnerabilities in the implementation of OAuth service provider libraries. To efficiently detect security violations in a large codebase of service provider implementation, Cerberus employs a query-driven algorithm for answering queries about OAuth specifications. We demonstrate the effectiveness of Cerberus by evaluating it on datasets of popular OAuth libraries with millions of downloads. Among these high-profile libraries, Cerberus has identified 47 vulnerabilities from ten classes of logical flaws, 24 of which were previously unknown. We got acknowledged by the developers of eight libraries and had three accepted CVEs.
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引用它的顶会 Paper6
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- Mini-Programs, Mega-Problems: Unveiling OAuth-based Authentication Misuses in Mini-Programs via Dynamic AnalysisZidong Zhang, Zhentao Xie, Lingyun Ying, Qinsheng Hou 等CCS 2026
- Universal Cross-app Attacks: Exploiting and Securing OAuth 2.0 in Integration PlatformsKaixuan Luo, Xianbo Wang, Adonis P. H. Fung, Wing Cheong Lau 等USENIX Security 2025
- Automated Repair of OpenID Connect ProgramsTamjid Al Rahat, Yanju Chen, Yu Feng, Yuan TianASE 2025
- "Only as Strong as the Weakest Link": On the Security of Brokered Single Sign-On on the WebTommaso Innocenti, Louis Jannett, Christian Mainka, Vladislav Mladenov 等S&P 2025
它引用的顶会 Paper10
- A Comprehensive Formal Security Analysis of OAuth 2.0Daniel Fett, Ralf Küsters, Guido SchmitzCCS 2016 · 被引用 228 次
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- Precise Android API Protection Mapping Derivation and ReasoningYousra Aafer, Guanhong Tao, Jianjun Huang, Xiangyu Zhang 等CCS 2018 · 被引用 51 次
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