Encoding Human Behavior in Information Design through Deep Learning
Guanghui Yu, Wei Tang, Saumik Narayanan, Chien-Ju Ho
摘要
We initiate the study of behavioral information design through deep learning. In information design, a sender aims to persuade a receiver to take certain actions by strategically revealing information. We address scenarios in which the receiver might exhibit different behavior patterns other than the standard Bayesian rational assumption. We propose HAIDNet, a neural-network-based optimization framework for information design that can adapt to multiple representations of human behavior. Through extensive simulation, we show that HAIDNet can not only recover information policies that are near-optimal compared with known analytical solutions, but also can extend to designing information policies for settings that are computationally challenging (e.g., when there are multiple receivers) or for settings where there are no known solutions in general (e.g., when the receiver behavior does not follow the Bayesian rational assumption). We also conduct real-world human-subject experiments and demonstrate that our framework can capture human behavior from data and lead to more effective information policy for real-world human receivers.
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