SAPIC+: protocol verifiers of the world, unite!
Vincent Cheval, Charlie Jacomme, Steve Kremer, Robert Künnemann
摘要
Symbolic security protocol verifiers have reached a high degree of automation and maturity. Today, experts can model real-world protocols, but this often requires model-specific encodings and deep insight into the strengths and weaknesses of each of those tools. With SAPIC + , we introduce a protocol verification platform that lifts this burden and permits choosing the right tool for the job, at any development stage. We build on the existing compiler from SAPIC to TAMARIN, and extend it with automated translations from SAPIC + to PROVERIF and DEEPSEC, as well as powerful, protocol-independent optimizations of the existing translation. We prove each part of these translations sound. A user can thus, with a single SAPIC + file, verify reachability and equivalence properties on the specified protocol, either using PROVERIF, TAMARIN or DEEPSEC. Moreover, the soundness of the translation allows to directly assume results proven by another tool which allows to exploit the respective strengths of each tool. We demonstrate our approach by analyzing various existing models. This includes a large case study of the 5G authentication protocols, previously analyzed in TAMARIN. Encoding this model in SAPIC + we demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach. Moreover, we study four new case studies: the LAKE-EDHOC [49] and the Privacy-Pass [22] protocols, both under standardization, the SSH [50] protocol with the agentforwarding feature, and the recent KEMTLS [48] protocol, a post-quantum version of the main TLS key exchange.
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引用它的顶会 Paper12
- Terrapin Attack: Breaking SSH Channel Integrity By Sequence Number ManipulationFabian Bäumer, Marcus Brinkmann, Jörg SchwenkUSENIX Security 2024 · 被引用 15 次
- Automated Side-Channel Analysis of Cryptographic Protocol ImplementationsFaezeh Nasrabadi, Robert Künnemann, Hamed NematiCCS 2026 · 被引用 2 次
- CrypFormBench: Benchmarking Formal Analysis Capability of Large Language Models for Cryptographic SchemesZhaoxuan Li, Qionglu Zhang, Hengyuan Liu, Xiaoyan Gu 等FSE 2026 · 被引用 1 次
- Revisiting PQ Wireguard: A Comprehensive Security Analysis with a New Design Using Reinforced KEMsKeitaro Hashimoto, Shuichi Katsumata, Guilhem Niot, Thom WiggersS&P 2026
- Secure Protocol Composition under Dynamic Corruption: Scaling Up Symbolic Analysis for Real-World Security PropertiesCas Cremers, Erik Pallas, Aleksi PeltonenUSENIX Security 2026
它引用的顶会 Paper11
- A Formal Analysis of 5G AuthenticationDavid A. Basin, Jannik Dreier, Lucca Hirschi, Sasa Radomirovic 等CCS 2018 · 被引用 428 次
- A Comprehensive Symbolic Analysis of TLS 1.3Cas Cremers, Marko Horvat, Jonathan Hoyland, Sam Scott 等CCS 2017 · 被引用 247 次
- Verified Models and Reference Implementations for the TLS 1.3 Standard CandidateKarthikeyan Bhargavan, Bruno Blanchet, Nadim KobeissiS&P 2017 · 被引用 233 次
- SoK: Computer-Aided CryptographyManuel Barbosa, Gilles Barthe, Karthik Bhargavan, Bruno Blanchet 等S&P 2021 · 被引用 169 次
- Post-Quantum TLS Without Handshake SignaturesPeter Schwabe, Douglas Stebila, Thom WiggersCCS 2020 · 被引用 162 次
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