ISA-Grid: Architecture of Fine-grained Privilege Control for Instructions and Registers
Shulin Fan, Zhichao Hua, Yubin Xia, Haibo Chen, Binyu Zang
摘要
Isolation is a critical mechanism for enhancing the security of computer systems. By controlling the access privileges of software and hardware resources, isolation mechanisms can decouple software into multiple isolated components and enforce the principle of least privilege. While existing isolation systems primarily focus on memory isolation, they overlook the isolation of instruction and register resources, which we refer to as ISA (Instruction Set Architecture) resources. However, previous works have shown that exploiting ISA resources can lead to serious security problems, such as breaking the system's memory isolation property by abusing x86's CR3 register. Furthermore, existing hardware only provides privilege-level-based access control for ISA resources, which is too coarse-grained for software decoupling. For example, ARM Cortex A53 has several hundred system instructions/registers, but only four exception levels (EL0 to EL3) are provided. Additionally, more than 100 instructions/registers for system control are available in only EL1 (the kernel mode). To address this problem, this paper proposes ISA-Grid, an architecture of fine-grained privilege control for instructions and registers. ISA-Grid is a hardware extension that enables the creation of multiple ISA domains, with each domain having different privileges to access instructions and registers. The ISA domain can provide bit-level fine-grained privilege control for registers. We implemented prototypes of ISA-Grid based on two different CPU cores: 1) a RISC-V CPU core on an FPGA board and 2) an x86 CPU core on a simulator. We applied ISA-Grid to different cases, including Linux kernel decomposition and enhancing existing security systems, to demonstrate how ISA-Grid can isolate ISA resources and mitigate attacks based on abusing them. The performance evaluation results on both x86 and RISC-V platforms with real-world applications showed that ISA-Grid has negligible runtime overhead (less than 1%).
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