vTZ: Virtualizing ARM TrustZone
Zhichao Hua, Jinyu Gu, Yubin Xia, Haibo Chen, Binyu Zang, Haibing Guan
摘要
ARM TrustZone, a security extension that provides a secure world, a trusted execution environment (TEE), to run security-sensitive code, has been widely adopted in mobile platforms. With the increasing momentum of ARM64 being adopted in server markets like cloud, it is likely to see TrustZone being adopted as a key pillar for cloud security. Unfortunately, TrustZone is not designed to be virtualizable as there is only one TEE provided by the hardware, which prevents it from being securely shared by multiple virtual machines (VMs). This paper conducts a study on variable approaches to virtualizing TrustZone in virtualized environments and then presents vTZ, a solution that securely provides each guest VM with a virtualized guest TEE using existing hardware. vTZ leverages the idea of separating functionality from protection by maintaining a secure co-running VM to serve as a guest TEE, while using the hardware TrustZone to enforce strong isolation among guest TEEs and the untrusted hypervisor. Specifically, vTZ uses a tiny monitor running within the physical TrustZone that securely interposes and virtualizes memory mapping and world switching. vTZ further leverages a few pieces of protected, self-contained code running in a Constrained Isolated Execution Environment (CIEE) to provide secure virtualization and isolation among multiple guest TEEs. We have implemented vTZ on Xen 4.8 on both ARMv7 and ARMv8 development boards. Evaluation using two common TEE-kernels (secure kernel running in TEE) such as seL4 1 and OP-TEE shows that vTZ provides strong security with small performance overhead.
问问这篇 Paper
智能体会读完全文。
Lune 把这篇 Paper 索引到了最后一个公式,引用它的顶会 Paper 也一样。你提问,回答直接引用原文。
引用它的顶会 Paper20
- SANCTUARY: ARMing TrustZone with User-space EnclavesFerdinand Brasser, David Gens, Patrick Jauernig, Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi 等NDSS 2019 · 被引用 191 次
- CURE: A Security Architecture with CUstomizable and Resilient EnclavesRaad Bahmani, Ferdinand Brasser, Ghada Dessouky, Patrick Jauernig 等USENIX Security 2021 · 被引用 150 次
- Scalable Memory Protection in the PENGLAI EnclaveErhu Feng, Xu Lu, Dong Du, Bicheng Yang 等OSDI 2021 · 被引用 126 次
- Protecting Cloud Virtual Machines from Hypervisor and Host Operating System ExploitsShih-Wei Li, John S. Koh, Jason NiehUSENIX Security 2019 · 被引用 49 次
- Understanding the Security of ARM Debugging FeaturesZhenyu Ning, Fengwei ZhangS&P 2019 · 被引用 41 次
它引用的顶会 Paper2
相关 Paper
- VirTEE: a full backward-compatible TEE with native live migration and secure I/OJianqiang Wang, Pouya Mahmoody, Ferdinand Brasser, Patrick Jauernig 等DAC 2022 · 被引用 11 次
- TwinVisor: Hardware-isolated Confidential Virtual Machines for ARMDingji Li, Zeyu Mi, Yubin Xia, Binyu Zang 等SOSP 2021 · 被引用 39 次
- FPGA-TrustZone: Security Extension of TrustZone to FPGA for SoC-FPGA Heterogeneous ArchitectureShupeng Wang, Xindong Fan, Xiao Xu, Shuchen Wang 等DAC 2025 · 被引用 1 次
- ZION: A Practical Confidential Virtual Machine Architecture on Commodity RISC-V ProcessorsJie Wang, Juan Wang, Yinqian ZhangDAC 2025 · 被引用 3 次
- SHELTER: Extending Arm CCA with Isolation in User SpaceYiming Zhang, Yuxin Hu, Zhenyu Ning, Fengwei Zhang 等USENIX Security 2023
