Efficient Last-Iterate Convergence in Solving Extensive-Form Games
Linjian Meng, Tianpei Yang, Youzhi Zhang, Zhenxing Ge, Shangdong Yang, Tianyu Ding, Wenbin Li, Bo An, Yang Gao
摘要
To establish last-iterate convergence for Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR) algorithms in learning a Nash equilibrium (NE) of extensive-form games (EFGs), recent studies reformulate learning an NE of the original EFG as learning the NEs of a sequence of (perturbed) regularized EFGs. Hence, proving last-iterate convergence in solving the original EFG reduces to proving last-iterate convergence in solving (perturbed) regularized EFGs. However, these studies only establish last-iterate convergence for Online Mirror Descent (OMD)-based CFR algorithms instead of Regret Matching (RM)-based CFR algorithms in solving perturbed regularized EFGs, resulting in a poor empirical convergence rate, as RM-based CFR algorithms typically outperform OMD-based CFR algorithms. In addition, as solving multiple perturbed regularized EFGs is required, fine-tuning across multiple perturbed regularized EFGs is infeasible, making parameter-free algorithms highly desirable. This paper show that CFR + , a classical parameter-free RM-based CFR algorithm, achieves last-iterate convergence in learning an NE of perturbed regularized EFGs. This is the first parameter-free last-iterate convergence for RM-based CFR algorithms in perturbed regularized EFGs. Leveraging CFR + to solve perturbed regularized EFGs, we get Reward Transformation CFR + (RTCFR + ). Importantly, we extend prior work on the parameter-free property of CFR + , enhancing its stability, which is vital for the empirical convergence of RTCFR + . Experiments show that RTCFR + exhibits a significantly faster empirical convergence rate than existing algorithms that achieve theoretical last-iterate convergence. Interestingly, RTCFR + show performance no worse than average-iterate convergence CFR algorithms. It is the first last-iterate convergence algorithm to achieve such performance. Our code is available at https://github.com/menglinjian/NeurIPS-2025-RTCFR .
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