Lune

ICLR2020Top-tier venue

Lazy-CFR: fast and near-optimal regret minimization for extensive games with imperfect information

Yichi Zhou, Tongzheng Ren, Jialian Li, Dong Yan, Jun Zhu

2020Year
15Citations
4Top-tier citations

Abstract

Counterfactual regret minimization (CFR) is the most popular algorithm on solving two-player zero-sum extensive games with imperfect information and achieves state-of-the-art performance in practice. However, the performance of CFR is not fully understood, since empirical results on the regret are much better than the upper bound proved in . Another issue is that CFR has to traverse the whole game tree in each round, which is time-consuming in large scale games. In this paper, we present a novel technique, lazy update, which can avoid traversing the whole game tree in CFR, as well as a novel analysis on the regret of CFR with lazy update. Our analysis can also be applied to the vanilla CFR, resulting in a much tighter regret bound than that in . Inspired by lazy update, we further present a novel CFR variant, named Lazy-CFR. Compared to traversing O(∣I∣)O(|\mathcal{I}|) information sets in vanilla CFR, Lazy-CFR needs only to traverse O(∣I∣)O(\sqrt{|\mathcal{I}|}) information sets per round while keeping the regret bound almost the same, where I\mathcal{I} is the class of all information sets. As a result, Lazy-CFR shows better convergence result compared with vanilla CFR. Experimental results consistently show that Lazy-CFR outperforms the vanilla CFR significantly.

Ask about this paper

Your agent reads all of it.

Lune indexed this paper to the last equation, along with the top-tier papers that cite it. Ask a question and the answer quotes them.

Questions to start from

Your agent calls

Luneget_paper_fulltext

Ask in Lune

Free to start. No credit card required.

lune papers fulltext fe530a48-1b52-4eec-bce6-cefdeda34e31

Cited by top-tier papers4

Ask how each one uses it

Related papers

Dusk over the sea between two cliffs drawn in fine vertical lines