ASTERINAS: A Linux ABI-Compatible, Rust-Based Framekernel OS with a Small and Sound TCB
Yuke Peng, Hongliang Tian, Junyang Zhang, Ruihan Li, Chengjun Chen, Jianfeng Jiang, Jinyi Xian, Xiaolin Wang, Chenren Xu, Diyu Zhou, Yingwei Luo, Shoumeng Yan, Yinqian Zhang
Abstract
How can one build a feature-rich, general-purpose, Rust-based operating system (OS) with a minimal and sound Trusted Computing Base (TCB) for memory safety? Existing Rust-based OSes fall short due to their improper use of unsafe Rust in kernel development. To address this challenge, we propose a novel OS architecture called framekernel that realizes Rust's full potential to achieve intra-kernel privilege separation, ensuring TCB minimality and soundness. We present OSTD, a streamlined framework for safe Rust OS development, and Asterinas, a Linux ABI-compatible framekernel OS implemented entirely in safe Rust using OSTD. Supporting over 210 Linux system calls, Asterinas delivers performance on par with Linux, while maintaining a minimized, memory-safety TCB of only about 14.0% of the codebase. These results underscore the practicality and benefits of the framekernel architecture in building safe and efficient OSes.
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