How do programmers use unsafe rust?
Vytautas Astrauskas, Christoph Matheja, Federico Poli, Peter Müller, Alexander J. Summers
Abstract
Rust’s ownership type system enforces a strict discipline on how memory locations are accessed and shared. This discipline allows the compiler to statically prevent memory errors, data races, inadvertent side effects through aliasing, and other errors that frequently occur in conventional imperative programs. However, the restrictions imposed by Rust’s type system make it difficult or impossible to implement certain designs, such as data structures that require aliasing (e.g. doubly-linked lists and shared caches). To work around this limitation, Rust allows code blocks to be declared as unsafe and thereby exempted from certain restrictions of the type system, for instance, to manipulate C-style raw pointers. Ensuring the safety of unsafe code is the responsibility of the programmer. However, an important assumption of the Rust language, which we dub the Rust hypothesis , is that programmers use Rust by following three main principles: use unsafe code sparingly, make it easy to review, and hide it behind a safe abstraction such that client code can be written in safe Rust. Understanding how Rust programmers use unsafe code and, in particular, whether the Rust hypothesis holds is essential for Rust developers and testers, language and library designers, as well as tool developers. This paper studies empirically how unsafe code is used in practice by analysing a large corpus of Rust projects to assess the validity of the Rust hypothesis and to classify the purpose of unsafe code. We identify queries that can be answered by automatically inspecting the program’s source code, its intermediate representation MIR, as well as type information provided by the Rust compiler; we complement the results by manual code inspection. Our study supports the Rust hypothesis partially: While most unsafe code is simple and well-encapsulated, unsafe features are used extensively, especially for interoperability with other languages.
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Install the CLIlune papers fulltext 61ae6436-a85b-4239-ad77-d861b5ab7173Cited by top-tier papers27
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