Lune

S&P2017Top-tier venue

CRLite: A Scalable System for Pushing All TLS Revocations to All Browsers

James Larisch, David R. Choffnes, Dave Levin, Bruce M. Maggs, Alan Mislove, Christo Wilson

2017Year
105Citations
19Top-tier citations

Abstract

Currently, no major browser fully checks for TLS/SSL certificate revocations. This is largely due to the fact that the deployed mechanisms for disseminating revocations (CRLs, OCSP, OCSP Stapling, CRLSet, and OneCRL) are each either incomplete, insecure, inefficient, slow to update, not private, or some combination thereof. In this paper, we present CRLite, an efficient and easily-deployable system for proactively pushing all TLS certificate revocations to browsers. CRLite servers aggregate revocation information for all known, valid TLS certificates on the web, and store them in a space-efficient filter cascade data structure. Browsers periodically download and use this data to check for revocations of observed certificates in realtime. CRLite does not require any additional trust beyond the existing PKI, and it allows clients to adopt a fail-closed security posture even in the face of network errors or attacks that make revocation information temporarily unavailable. We present a prototype of CRLite that processes TLS certificates gathered by Rapid7, the University of Michigan, and Google's Certificate Transparency on the server-side, with a Firefox extension on the client-side. Comparing CRLite to an idealized browser that performs correct CRL/OCSP checking, we show that CRLite reduces latency and eliminates privacy concerns. Moreover, CRLite has low bandwidth costs: it can represent all certificates with an initial download of 10 MB (less than 1 byte per revocation) followed by daily updates of 580 KB on average. Taken together, our results demonstrate that complete TLS/SSL revocation checking is within reach for all clients. Recent measurement studies demonstrate that revocation is prevalent in the web's PKI [49] . More than 99% of valid certificates available on the web contain a reachable CRL URL, while 95% include a reachable OCSP responder. Liu et al. observe that 8% of all valid certificates are revoked (6% if we focus just on valid EV certificates) [49] , with the bulk of these revocations occurring due to Heartbleed [76], [19] .

Ask about this paper

Your agent reads all of it.

Lune indexed this paper to the last equation, along with the top-tier papers that cite it. Ask a question and the answer quotes them.

Questions to start from

Your agent calls

Luneget_paper_fulltext

Ask in Lune

Free to start. No credit card required.

Cited by top-tier papers19

Ask how each one uses it

Builds on4

Related papers

Dusk over the sea between two cliffs drawn in fine vertical lines