Does Certificate Transparency Break the Web? Measuring Adoption and Error Rate
Emily Stark, Ryan Sleevi, Rijad Muminovic, Devon O'Brien, Eran Messeri, Adrienne Porter Felt, Brendan McMillion, Parisa Tabriz
Abstract
Certificate Transparency (CT) is an emerging system for enabling the rapid discovery of malicious or misissued certificates. Initially standardized in 2013, CT is now finally beginning to see widespread support. Although CT provides desirable security benefits, web browsers cannot begin requiring all websites to support CT at once, due to the risk of breaking large numbers of websites. We discuss challenges for deployment, analyze the adoption of CT on the web, and measure the error rates experienced by users of the Google Chrome web browser. We find that CT has so far been widely adopted with minimal breakage and warnings. Security researchers often struggle with the tradeoff between security and user frustration: rolling out new security requirements often causes breakage. We view CT as a case study for deploying ecosystem-wide change while trying to minimize end user impact. We discuss the design properties of CT that made its success possible, as well as draw lessons from its risks and pitfalls that could be avoided in future large-scale security deployments.
Ask about this paper
Your agent reads all of it.
Lune indexed this paper to the last equation, along with the top-tier papers that cite it. Ask a question and the answer quotes them.
Your agent calls
Luneget_paper_fulltext
Free to start. No credit card required.
Terminal
Install the CLIlune papers fulltext 47ec6114-2a89-449e-86dc-afc7d89881beCited by top-tier papers7
- TLS 1.3 in Practice: How TLS 1.3 Contributes to the InternetHyunwoo Lee, Doowon Kim, Yonghwi KwonWWW 2021 · 47 citations
- Certificate Transparency in the Wild: Exploring the Reliability of MonitorsBingyu Li, Jingqiang Lin, Fengjun Li, Qiongxiao Wang et al.CCS 2019 · 45 citations
- Rusted Anchors: A National Client-Side View of Hidden Root CAs in the Web PKI EcosystemYiming Zhang, Baojun Liu, Chaoyi Lu, Zhou Li et al.CCS 2021 · 16 citations
- An Empirical Study of the Use of Integrity Verification Mechanisms for Web SubresourcesBertil Chapuis, Olamide Omolola, Mauro Cherubini, Mathias Humbert et al.WWW 2020 · 13 citations
- F-PKI: Enabling Innovation and Trust Flexibility in the HTTPS Public-Key InfrastructureLaurent Chuat, Cyrill Krähenbühl, Prateek Mittal, Adrian PerrigNDSS 2022
Builds on1
Related papers
- Certificate Transparency Revisited: The Public Inspections on Third-party MonitorsAozhuo Sun, Jingqiang Lin, Wei Wang, Zeyan Liu et al.NDSS 2024
- Accountability in Certificate Transparency and VariantsTimo Treitz, Robert KünnemannCCS 2026
- CTng: Secure Certificate and Revocation TransparencyJie Kong, James Damon, Hemi Leibowitz, Ewa Syta et al.NDSS 2026 · 5 citations
- Deep Dive into In-app Browsers: Uncovering Hidden Pitfalls in Certificate ValidationWoonghee Lee, Junbeom Hur, Hyunsoo KwonCCS 2025
- Where the Wild Warnings Are: Root Causes of Chrome HTTPS Certificate ErrorsMustafa Emre Acer, Emily Stark, Adrienne Porter Felt, Sascha Fahl et al.CCS 2017 · 53 citations
