USENIX Security2024Top-tier venue
Snowflake, a censorship circumvention system using temporary WebRTC proxies
Cecylia Bocovich, Arlo Breault, David Fifield, Serene, Xiaokang Wang
Abstract
Snowflake is a system for circumventing Internet censorship. Its blocking resistance comes from the use of numerous, ultralight, temporary proxies ("snowflakes"), which accept traffic from censored clients using peer-to-peer WebRTC protocols and forward it to a centralized bridge. The temporary proxies are simple enough to be implemented in JavaScript, in a web page or browser extension, making them much cheaper to run than a traditional proxy or VPN server. The large and constantly changing pool of proxy addresses resists enumeration and blocking by a censor. The system is built on the assumption that proxies may appear or disappear at any time: clients discover live proxies dynamically using a secure rendezvous protocol; when an in-use proxy goes offline, its client switches to another on the fly, invisibly to upper network layers. Snowflake has been deployed with success in Tor Browser and Orbot for several years. It has been a significant circumvention tool during high-profile network disruptions, including in Russia in 2021 and Iran in 2022. In this paper, we explain the composition of Snowflake's many parts, give a history of deployment and blocking attempts, and reflect on implications for circumvention generally.
Ask about this paper
Your agent reads all of it.
Lune indexed this paper to the last equation, along with the top-tier papers that cite it. Ask a question and the answer quotes them.
Your agent calls
Luneget_paper_fulltext
Free to start. No credit card required.
Terminal
Install the CLIlune papers fulltext e89abeb2-c9e9-40af-86a6-404308dce6d3Cited by top-tier papers5
- SpotProxy: Rediscovering the Cloud for Censorship CircumventionPatrick Tser Jern Kon, Sina Kamali, Jinyu Pei, Diogo Barradas et al.USENIX Security 2024 · 7 citations
- Mirage: Private, Mobility-based Routing for Censorship EvasionZachary Ratliff, RuoxingYang, Avery Bai, Harel Berger et al.NDSS 2026 · 1 citation
- Huma: Censorship Circumvention via Web Protocol Tunneling with Deferred Traffic ReplacementSina Kamali, Diogo BarradasNDSS 2026 · 1 citation
- Evaluating Practical Enumeration and Blocking Attacks on the Snowflake Circumvention SystemLinden Chen, Ryan Sangha, Cecylia Bocovich, Ram Sundara RamanCCS 2026
- CircumVolve: Automated Discovery of Censorship Evasion Strategies Using Large Language ModelsAli Zohaib, Jackson Sippe, Jade Sheffey, Mingshi Wu et al.CCS 2026
Builds on8
- New Directions in Automated Traffic AnalysisJordan Holland, Paul Schmitt, Nick Feamster, Prateek MittalCCS 2021 · 122 citations
- The use of TLS in Censorship CircumventionSergey Frolov, Eric WustrowNDSS 2019 · 97 citations
- SoK: Towards Grounding Censorship Circumvention in EmpiricismMichael Carl Tschantz, Sadia Afroz, anonymous, Vern PaxsonS&P 2016 · 89 citations
- Censored Planet: An Internet-wide, Longitudinal Censorship ObservatoryRam Sundara Raman, Prerana Shenoy, Katharina Kohls, Roya EnsafiCCS 2020 · 68 citations
- Conjure: Summoning Proxies from Unused Address SpaceSergey Frolov, Jack Wampler, Sze Chuen Tan, J. Alex Halderman et al.CCS 2019 · 28 citations
Related papers
- Poking a Hole in the Wall: Efficient Censorship-Resistant Internet Communications by Parasitizing on WebRTCDiogo Barradas, Nuno Santos, Luís E. T. Rodrigues, Vítor NunesCCS 2020 · 41 citations
- MassBrowser: Unblocking the Censored Web for the Masses, by the MassesMilad Nasr, Hadi Zolfaghari, Amir Houmansadr, Amirhossein GhafariNDSS 2020
- NetShuffle: Circumventing Censorship with Shuffle Proxies at the EdgePatrick Tser Jern Kon, Aniket Gattani, Dhiraj Saharia, Tianyu Cao et al.S&P 2024 · 6 citations
- Slitheen: Perfectly Imitated Decoy Routing through Traffic ReplacementCecylia Bocovich, Ian GoldbergCCS 2016 · 40 citations
- On Precisely Detecting Censorship Circumvention in Real-World NetworksRyan Wails, George Arnold Sullivan, Micah Sherr, Rob JansenNDSS 2024
