MassBrowser: Unblocking the Censored Web for the Masses, by the Masses
Milad Nasr, Hadi Zolfaghari, Amir Houmansadr, Amirhossein Ghafari
Abstract
Existing censorship circumvention systems fail to offer reliable circumvention without sacrificing their users’ QoS and privacy, or undertaking high costs of operation. We have designed and implemented a censorship circumvention system, MassBrowser, whose goal is to offer effective censorship circumvention to a large mass of censored users, with a high quality of service (QoS), low cost of operation, and adjustable privacy protection. Towards this, we have made several key decisions in designing our system. First, we argue that circumvention systems should not bundle strong privacy protections (like anonymity) with censorship circumvention. Additional privacy properties should be offered to the users of circumvention systems as optional features which can be enabled by specific users or on specific connections (perhaps by trading off some QoS). Second, we have engineered MassBrowser by combining various state-of-the-art circumvention techniques to ensure strong censorship resilience at a very low cost of operation (i.e., $0.0001 per censored client per month when deployed at a large scale). In particular, MassBrowser aims at increasing the collateral damage of censorship by employing a “mass” of normal Internet users, from both censored and non-censored areas, to serve as circumvention proxies. Also, MassBrowser uses various techniques, like CDNBrowsing, to optimize the loads on circumvention proxies. We have built and deployed MassBrowser as a fully operational system with end-user GUI software for major operating systems. Our system has been in the beta release mode for over a year with hundreds of invited users from major censored countries testing it on a daily basis.
Ask about this paper
Your agent reads all of it.
Lune indexed this paper to the last equation, along with the top-tier papers that cite it. Ask a question and the answer quotes them.
Cited by top-tier papers5
- Censored Planet: An Internet-wide, Longitudinal Censorship ObservatoryRam Sundara Raman, Prerana Shenoy, Katharina Kohls, Roya EnsafiCCS 2020 · 68 citations
- Understanding the Impact of Encrypted DNS on Internet CensorshipLin Jin, Shuai Hao, Haining Wang, Chase CottonWWW 2021 · 29 citations
- Snowflake, a censorship circumvention system using temporary WebRTC proxiesCecylia Bocovich, Arlo Breault, David Fifield, Serene et al.USENIX Security 2024 · 18 citations
- Evaluating Practical Enumeration and Blocking Attacks on the Snowflake Circumvention SystemLinden Chen, Ryan Sangha, Cecylia Bocovich, Ram Sundara RamanCCS 2026
- On Precisely Detecting Censorship Circumvention in Real-World NetworksRyan Wails, George Arnold Sullivan, Micah Sherr, Rob JansenNDSS 2024
Builds on7
- Global Measurement of DNS ManipulationPaul Pearce, Ben Jones, Frank Li, Roya Ensafi et al.USENIX Security 2017 · 163 citations
- ICLab: A Global, Longitudinal Internet Censorship Measurement PlatformArian Akhavan Niaki, Shinyoung Cho, Zachary Weinberg, Nguyen Phong Hoang et al.S&P 2020 · 94 citations
- SoK: Towards Grounding Censorship Circumvention in EmpiricismMichael Carl Tschantz, Sadia Afroz, anonymous, Vern PaxsonS&P 2016 · 89 citations
- Practical Censorship Evasion Leveraging Content Delivery NetworksHadi Zolfaghari, Amir HoumansadrCCS 2016 · 44 citations
- The Waterfall of Liberty: Decoy Routing Circumvention that Resists Routing AttacksMilad Nasr, Hadi Zolfaghari, Amir HoumansadrCCS 2017 · 43 citations
Related papers
- Bridging Barriers: A Survey of Challenges and Priorities in the Censorship Circumvention LandscapeDiwen Xue, Anna Ablove, Reethika Ramesh, Grace Kwak Danciu et al.USENIX Security 2024 · 7 citations
- Domain Shadowing: Leveraging Content Delivery Networks for Robust Blocking-Resistant CommunicationsMingkui WeiUSENIX Security 2021 · 20 citations
- Detecting Probe-resistant ProxiesSergey Frolov, Jack Wampler, Eric WustrowNDSS 2020
- Enemy At the Gateways: Censorship-Resilient Proxy Distribution Using Game TheoryMilad Nasr, Sadegh Farhang, Amir Houmansadr, Jens GrossklagsNDSS 2019 · 15 citations
- Learning from Censored Experiences: Social Media Discussions around Censorship Circumvention TechnologiesElham Pourabbas Vafa, Mohit Singhal, Poojitha Thota, Sayak Saha RoyS&P 2025
