Autobidder's Dilemma: Why More Sophisticated Autobidders Lead to Worse Auction Efficiency
Yuan Deng, Jieming Mao, Vahab Mirrokni, Hanrui Zhang, Song Zuo
Abstract
The recent increasing adoption of autobidding has inspired the growing interest in analyzing the performance of classic mechanism with value-maximizing autobidders both theoretically and empirically. It is known that optimal welfare can be obtained in first-price auctions if autobidders are restricted to uniform bid-scaling and the price of anarchy is 2 when non-uniform bid-scaling strategies are allowed. In this paper, we provide a fine-grained price of anarchy analysis for non-uniform bid-scaling strategies in first-price auctions, demonstrating the reason why more powerful (individual) non-uniform bid-scaling strategies may lead to worse (aggregated) performance in social welfare. Our theoretical results match recent empirical findings that a higher level of non-uniform bid-scaling leads to lower welfare performance in first-price auctions.
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- Auction Design in an Auto-bidding Setting: Randomization Improves Efficiency Beyond VCG cites Towards Efficient Auctions in an Auto-bidding World
- Efficiency of Non-Truthful Auctions in Auto-bidding: The Power of Randomization cites Auction Design in an Auto-bidding Setting: Randomization Improves Efficiency Beyond VCG
- Efficiency of Non-Truthful Auctions in Auto-bidding: The Power of Randomization cites Towards Efficient Auctions in an Auto-bidding World
- Multi-channel Autobidding with Budget and ROI Constraints cites Auction Design in an Auto-bidding Setting: Randomization Improves Efficiency Beyond VCG
- Multi-channel Autobidding with Budget and ROI Constraints cites Towards Efficient Auctions in an Auto-bidding World
- Multi-channel Autobidding with Budget and ROI Constraints cites Robust Auction Design in the Auto-bidding World
Builds on11
- Robust Auction Design in the Auto-bidding WorldSantiago R. Balseiro, Yuan Deng, Jieming Mao, Vahab S. Mirrokni et al.NeurIPS 2021 · 95 citations
- Towards Efficient Auctions in an Auto-bidding WorldYuan Deng, Jieming Mao, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Song ZuoWWW 2021 · 87 citations
- Auction Design in an Auto-bidding Setting: Randomization Improves Efficiency Beyond VCGAranyak MehtaWWW 2022 · 41 citations
- Multi-channel Autobidding with Budget and ROI ConstraintsYuan Deng, Negin Golrezaei, Patrick Jaillet, Jason Cheuk Nam Liang et al.ICML 2023 · 34 citations
- Efficiency of Non-Truthful Auctions in Auto-bidding: The Power of RandomizationChristopher Liaw, Aranyak Mehta, Andrés PerlrothWWW 2023 · 14 citations
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