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Riggs: Decentralized Sealed-Bid Auctions

Nirvan Tyagi, Arasu Arun, Cody Freitag, Riad S. Wahby, Joseph Bonneau, David Mazières

2023Year
15Citations
4Top-tier citations

Abstract

We introduce the first practical protocols for fully decentralized sealed-bid auctions using timed commitments. Timed commitments ensure that the auction is finalized fairly even if all participants drop out after posting bids or if n bidders collude to try to learn the nth bidder's bid value. Our protocols rely on a novel non-malleable timed commitment scheme which efficiently supports range proofs to establish that bidders have sufficient funds to cover a hidden bid value. This allows us to penalize users who abandon bids for exactly the bid value, while supporting simultaneous bidding in multiple auctions with a shared collateral pool. Our protocols are concretely efficient and we have implemented them in an Ethereum-compatible smart contract which automatically enforces payment and delivery of an auctioned digital asset.

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