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DualGFL: Federated Learning with a Dual-Level Coalition-Auction Game

Xiaobing Chen, Xiangwei Zhou, Songyang Zhang, Mingxuan Sun

2025Year

Abstract

Despite some promising results in federated learning using game-theoretical methods, most existing studies mainly employ a one-level game in either a cooperative or competitive environment, failing to capture the complex dynamics among participants in practice. To address this issue, we propose DualGFL, a novel federated learning framework with a dual-level game in cooperative-competitive environments. DualGFL includes a lower-level hedonic game where clients form coalitions and an upper-level multi-attribute auction game where coalitions bid for training participation. At the lower-level DualGFL, we introduce a new auction-aware utility function and propose a Pareto-optimal partitioning algorithm to find a Pareto-optimal partition based on clients' preference profiles. At the upper-level DualGFL, we formulate a multi-attribute auction game with resource constraints and derive equilibrium bids to maximize coalitions' winning probabilities and profits. A greedy algorithm is proposed to maximize the utility of the central server. Extensive experiments on real-world datasets demonstrate DualGFL's effectiveness in improving both server utility and client utility.

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