Be Careful of What You Embed: Demystifying OLE Vulnerabilities
Yunpeng Tian, Feng Dong, Haoyi Liu, Meng Xu, Zhiniang Peng, Zesen Ye, Shenghui Li, Xiapu Luo, Haoyu Wang
Abstract
—Microsoft Office is a comprehensive suite of productivity tools and Object Linking & Embedding (OLE) is a specification that standardizes the linking and embedding of a diverse set of objects across different applications. OLE facilitates data interchange and streamlines user experience when dealing with composite documents (e.g., an embedded Excel sheet in a Word document). However, inherent security weaknesses within the design of OLE present risks, as the design of OLE inherently blurs the trust boundary between first-party and third-party code, which may lead to unintended library loading and parsing vulnerabilities which could be exploited by malicious actors. Addressing this issue, this paper introduces OLExplore, a novel tool designed for security assessment of Office OLE objects. With an in-depth examination of historical OLE vulnerabilities, we have identified three key categories of vulnerabilities and subjected them to dynamic analysis and verification. Our evaluation of various Windows operating system versions has led to the discovery of 26 confirmed vulnerabilities, with 17 assigned CVE numbers that all have remote code execution potential.
Ask about this paper
Your agent reads all of it.
Lune indexed this paper to the last equation, along with the top-tier papers that cite it. Ask a question and the answer quotes them.
Your agent calls
Luneget_paper_fulltext
Free to start. No credit card required.
Terminal
Install the CLIlune papers fulltext d678dcda-e1e1-4cc8-9896-cd0978a6a56fCited by top-tier papers1
Ask how each one uses itBuilds on14
- SOK: (State of) The Art of War: Offensive Techniques in Binary AnalysisYan Shoshitaishvili, Ruoyu Wang, Christopher Salls, Nick Stephens et al.S&P 2016 · 1,085 citations
- QSYM : A Practical Concolic Execution Engine Tailored for Hybrid FuzzingInsu Yun, Sangho Lee, Meng Xu, Yeongjin Jang et al.USENIX Security 2018 · 537 citations
- kAFL: Hardware-Assisted Feedback Fuzzing for OS KernelsSergej Schumilo, Cornelius Aschermann, Robert Gawlik, Sebastian Schinzel et al.USENIX Security 2017 · 324 citations
- GRIMOIRE: Synthesizing Structure while FuzzingTim Blazytko, Cornelius Aschermann, Moritz Schlögel, Ali Abbasi et al.USENIX Security 2019 · 123 citations
- Nyx: Greybox Hypervisor Fuzzing using Fast Snapshots and Affine TypesSergej Schumilo, Cornelius Aschermann, Ali Abbasi, Simon Wörner et al.USENIX Security 2021 · 102 citations
Related papers
- Every Signature is Broken: On the Insecurity of Microsoft Office's OOXML SignaturesSimon Rohlmann, Vladislav Mladenov, Christian Mainka, Daniel Hirschberger et al.USENIX Security 2023
- Oops... Code Execution and Content Spoofing: The First Comprehensive Analysis of OpenDocument SignaturesSimon Rohlmann, Christian Mainka, Vladislav Mladenov, Jörg SchwenkUSENIX Security 2022
- SYMBEXCEL: Automated Analysis and Understanding of Malicious Excel 4.0 MacrosNicola Ruaro, Fabio Pagani, Stefano Ortolani, Christopher Kruegel et al.S&P 2022 · 12 citations
- Magneto: A Step-Wise Approach to Exploit Vulnerabilities in Dependent Libraries via LLM-Empowered Directed FuzzingZhuotong Zhou, Yongzhuo Yang, Susheng Wu, Yiheng Huang et al.ASE 2024 · 7 citations
- Beyond the Surface: Uncovering the Unprotected Components of Android Against Overlay AttackHao Zhou, Shuohan Wu, Chenxiong Qian, Xiapu Luo et al.NDSS 2024
