Burglars' IoT Paradise: Understanding and Mitigating Security Risks of General Messaging Protocols on IoT Clouds

With the increasing popularity of the Internet of Things (IoT), many IoT cloud platforms have emerged to help the IoT manufacturers connect their devices to their users. Serving the device-user communication is general messaging protocol deployed on the platforms. Less clear, however, is whether such protocols, which are not designed to work in the adversarial environment of IoT, introduce new risks. In this paper, we report the first systematic study on the protection of major IoT clouds (e.g., AWS, Microsoft, IBM) put in place for the arguably most popular messaging protocol - MQTT. We found that these platforms’ security additions to the protocol are all vulnerable, allowing the adversary to gain control of the device, launch a large-scale denial-of-service attack, steal the victim’s secrets data and fake the victim’s device status for deception. We successfully performed end-to-end attacks on these popular IoT clouds and further conducted a measurement study, which demonstrates that the security impacts of our attacks are real, severe and broad. We reported our findings to related parties, which all acknowledged the importance. We further propose new design principles and an enhanced access model MOUCON. We implemented our protection on a popular open-source MQTT server. Our evaluation shows its high effectiveness and negligible performance overhead.