Backdoors in RLVR: Jailbreak Backdoors in LLMs From Verifiable Reward
Weiyang Guo, Zesheng Shi, Zeen Zhu, Yuan Zhou, Min Zhang, Jing Li
Abstract
Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) is an emerging paradigm that significantly boosts a Large Language Model's (LLM's) reasoning abilities on complex logical tasks, such as mathematics and programming. However, we identify, for the first time, a latent vulnerability to backdoor attacks within the RLVR framework. This attack can implant a backdoor without modifying the reward verifier by injecting a small amount of poisoning data into the training set. Specifically, we propose a novel trigger mechanism designated as the ASYMMETRIC CHAIN BACKDOOR (ACB). The attack exploits the RLVR training loop by assigning substantial positive rewards for harmful responses and negative rewards for refusals. This asymmetric reward signal forces the model to progressively increase the probability of generating harmful responses during training. Our findings demonstrate that the RLVR backdoor attack is characterized by both high efficiency and strong generalization capabilities. Utilizing less than 2% poisoned data in train set, the backdoor can be successfully implanted across various model scales without degrading performance on benign tasks. Evaluations across multiple jailbreak benchmarks indicate that activating the trigger degrades safety performance by an average of 73%. Furthermore, the attack generalizes effectively to a wide range of jailbreak methods and unsafe behaviors. Code is available at https://github.com/yuki-younai/ Backdoor_in_RLVR .
Ask about this paper
Your agent reads all of it.
Lune indexed this paper to the last equation, along with the top-tier papers that cite it. Ask a question and the answer quotes them.
Your agent calls
Luneget_paper_fulltext
Free to start. No credit card required.
Terminal
Install the CLIlune papers fulltext cf3fd4aa-9e62-4d77-94a1-80052b0edd3aCited by top-tier papers3
- Why Supervised Fine-Tuning Fails to Learn: A Systematic Study of Incomplete Learning in Large Language ModelsChao Xue, Yao Wang, Mengqiao Liu, Di Liang et al.ACL 2026 · 5 citations
- GAMBIT: A Gamified Jailbreak Framework for Multimodal Large Language ModelsXiangdong Hu, Yangyang Jiang, Qin Hu, Xiaojun JiaACL 2026 · 2 citations
- Inverting the Shield: Systematically Generating Safety Tests from Policy SpecificationsXiaoyue Lu, Xianglin Yang, Haijun Liu, Jiahao Liu et al.ACL 2026
Builds on18
- Training language models to follow instructions with human feedbackLong Ouyang, Jeffrey Wu, Xu Jiang, Diogo Almeida et al.NeurIPS 2022 · 24,707 citations
- Measuring Massive Multitask Language UnderstandingDan Hendrycks, Collin Burns, Steven Basart, Andy Zou et al.ICLR 2021 · 7,905 citations
- Fine-tuning Aligned Language Models Compromises Safety, Even When Users Do Not Intend To!Xiangyu Qi, Yi Zeng, Tinghao Xie, Pin-Yu Chen et al.ICLR 2024 · 1,104 citations
- HarmBench: A Standardized Evaluation Framework for Automated Red Teaming and Robust RefusalMantas Mazeika, Long Phan, Xuwang Yin, Andy Zou et al.ICML 2024 · 1,031 citations
- Tree of Attacks: Jailbreaking Black-Box LLMs AutomaticallyAnay Mehrotra, Manolis Zampetakis, Paul Kassianik, Blaine Nelson et al.NeurIPS 2024 · 835 citations
Related papers
- Universal Jailbreak Backdoors from Poisoned Human FeedbackJavier Rando, Florian TramèrICLR 2024 · 124 citations
- From Poisoned to Aware: Fostering Backdoor Self-Awareness in LLMsGuangyu Shen, Siyuan Cheng, Xiangzhe Xu, Yuan Zhou et al.ICML 2026
- Beyond Training-time Poisoning: Component-level and Post-training Backdoors in Deep Reinforcement LearningSanyam Vyas, Alberto Caron, Chris Hicks, Pete Burnap et al.AAAI 2026
- RLHFPoison: Reward Poisoning Attack for Reinforcement Learning with Human Feedback in Large Language ModelsJiongxiao Wang, Junlin Wu, Muhao Chen, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik et al.ACL 2024
- Endless Jailbreaks with Bijection LearningBrian R. Y. Huang, Maximilian Li, Leonard TangICLR 2025
