USENIX Security2026Top-tier venue
The Ivory Tower Syndrome: Operators' Reflections on Academic BGP Security Solutions
Aleeza Suhel Inamdar, Tobias Fiebig, Mannat Kaur
Abstract
The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is the backbone of Internet routing, primarily used for exchanging network reachability information between autonomous systems on the Internet. BGP leverages a trust-based framework, where networks rely on each other's routing information implicitly. However, the initial design of BGP lacks in-built security mechanisms, thus making it vulnerable to various attacks and possibly network failures. Over the years, academics have introduced several solutions to enhance BGP security and address these vulnerabilities such as Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI), Secure Border Gateway Protocol, and BGPsec. However, academic solutions may not always be readily applied by network operators. It is, therefore, important to understand the existing challenges in the transition from academic research to widespread implementation. We engaged with 12 network operators via online focus groups, focusing on their work experiences in implementing various BGP security mechanisms. All participants noted a gap between academic research and industry needs, indicating misaligned priorities. To bridge this gap, they suggested more collaboration between the two domains -- particularly through increased researcher involvement in the network operators' community to understand practical challenges. We propose ways to foster such collaboration and urge the research community to reflect on the purpose behind publishing.
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