USENIX Security2017Top-tier venue
Towards Practical Tools for Side Channel Aware Software Engineering: 'Grey Box' Modelling for Instruction Leakages
David McCann, Elisabeth Oswald, Carolyn Whitnall
Abstract
Power (along with EM, cache and timing) leaks are of considerable concern for developers who have to deal with cryptographic components as part of their overall software implementation, in particular in the context of embedded devices. Whilst there exist some compiler tools to detect timing leaks, similar progress towards pinpointing power and EM leaks has been hampered by limits on the amount of information available about the physical components from which such leaks originate.
We suggest a novel modelling technique capable of producing high-quality instruction-level power (and/or EM) models without requiring a detailed hardware description of a processor nor information about the used process technology (access to both of which is typically restricted). We show that our methodology is effective at capturing differential data-dependent effects as neighbouring instructions in a sequence vary. We also explore register effects, and verify our models across several measurement boards to comment on board effects and portability. We confirm its versatility by demonstrating the basic technique on two processors (the ARM Cortex-M0 and M4), and use the M0 models to develop ELMO, the first leakage simulator for the ARM Cortex M0.
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Cited by top-tier papers7
- LWE with Side Information: Attacks and Concrete Security EstimationDana Dachman-Soled, Léo Ducas, Huijing Gong, Mélissa RossiCRYPTO 2020 · 162 citations
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- Rosita++: Automatic Higher-Order Leakage Elimination from Cryptographic CodeMadura A. Shelton, Lukasz Chmielewski, Niels Samwel, Markus Wagner et al.CCS 2021 · 11 citations
- Power Contracts: Provably Complete Power Leakage Models for ProcessorsRoderick Bloem, Barbara Gigerl, Marc Gourjon, Vedad Hadzic et al.CCS 2022 · 6 citations
- Hertzbleed: Turning Power Side-Channel Attacks Into Remote Timing Attacks on x86Yingchen Wang, Riccardo Paccagnella, Elizabeth Tang He, Hovav Shacham et al.USENIX Security 2022
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