Inducing Wireless Chargers to Voice Out for Inaudible Command Attacks
Donghui Dai, Zhenlin An, Lei Yang
Abstract
Recent works demonstrated that speech recognition systems or voice assistants can be manipulated by malicious voice commands, which are injected through various inaudible media, such as ultrasound, laser, and electromagnetic interference (EMI). In this work, we explore a new kind of inaudible voice attack through the magnetic interference induced by a wireless charger. Essentially, we show that the microphone components of smart devices suffer from severe magnetic interference when they are enjoying wireless charging, due to the absence of effective protection against the EMI at low frequencies (100 kHz or below). By taking advantage of this vulnerability, we design two inaudible voice attacks, HeartwormAttack and ParasiteAttack, both of which aim to inject malicious voice commands into smart devices being wirelessly charged. They make use of a compromised wireless charger or accessory equipment (called parasite) to inject the voice, respectively. We conduct extensive experiments with 17 victim devices (iPhone, Huawei, Samsung, etc.) and 6 types of voice assistants (Siri, Google STT, Bixby, etc.). Evaluation results demonstrate the feasibility of two proposed attacks with commercial charging settings.
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