CapSpeaker: Injecting Voices to Microphones via Capacitors
Xiaoyu Ji, Juchuan Zhang, Shui Jiang, Jishen Li, Wenyuan Xu
Abstract
Voice assistants can be manipulated by various malicious voice commands, yet existing attacks require a nearby speaker to play the attack commands. In this paper, we show that even when no speakers are available, we can play malicious commands by utilizing the capacitors inside electronic devices, i.e., we convert capacitors into speakers and call it CapSpeaker. Essentially, capacitors can emit acoustic noises due to the inverse piezoelectric effect, i.e., varying the voltage across a capacitor can make it vibrate and thus emit acoustic noises. Forcing capacitors to play malicious voice commands is challenging because (1) the frequency responses of capacitors as speakers have poor performance in the range of audible voices, and (2) we have no direct control over the voltage across capacitors to manipulate their emitting sounds. To overcome the challenges, we use a PWM-based modulation scheme to embed the malicious audio onto a high-frequency carrier, e.g., above 20 kHz, and we create malware that can induce the right voltage across the capacitors such that CapSpeaker plays the chosen malicious commands. We conducted extensive experiments with 2 LED lamps (a modified one and a commercial one) and 5 victim devices (iPhone 4s, iPad mini 5, Huawei Nova 5i, etc.). Evaluation results demonstrate that CapSpeaker is feasible at a distance up to 10.5 cm, triggering a smartphone to receive voice commands, e.g., "open the door''.
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