PGUS: Pretty Good User Security for Thick MVNOs with a Novel Sanitizable Blind Signature
Yang Yang, Quan Shi, Prosanta Gope, Behzad Abdolmaleki, Biplab Sikdar
Abstract
The rise of 5G technology has highlighted the critical role of Thick Mobile Virtual Network Operators (MVNOs) in providing customized mobile services. However, security and privacy challenges specific to Thick MVNOs remain inadequately addressed. In this paper, we present PGUS (Pretty Good User Security) for Thick MVNOs. Our proposed PGUS framework introduces a new cryptographic primitive called the Sanitizable Blind Signature (SBS), along with a novel Authentication and Key Agreement protocol named PGUS-AKA. Additionally, we have developed a seamless handover protocol, PGUS-HO, which is designed to secure all communication within a Thick MVNO environment. Furthermore, we conduct a thorough formal security analysis within the Universal Composability (UC) framework to address key threats, providing a strong solution for securing next-generation mobile networks. We also provide the evaluations on a 5G testbed which demonstrate the effectiveness of PGUS.
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