USENIX Security2021Top-tier venue
Pretty Good Phone Privacy
Paul Schmitt, Barath Raghavan
Abstract
A fundamental property of today's cellular architecture---in order to receive service, phones uniquely identify themselves to towers and thus to operators---is now a cause of major privacy violations. Over the past two years it has become clear that operators have sold and leaked identity and location data of hundreds of millions of mobile users. In this paper, we examine how to improve privacy in modern mobile networks. We take an end-to-end perspective on today's cellular architecture and find key points of decoupling that enable a new type of operator to offer privacy-enhanced service with no changes to physical infrastructure and without direct cooperation from existing operators. We describe Pretty Good Phone Privacy (PGPP) and demonstrate how our modified backend stack (EPC) works with real phones to provide ordinary yet privacy-preserving connectivity. We explore inherent privacy and efficiency tradeoffs in a simulation of a large metropolitan region. We show how PGPP maintains today's control overheads while significantly improving user identity and location privacy.
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Install the CLIlune papers fulltext 18d77cb0-b20d-4df2-98a4-de90f8a46c10Cited by top-tier papers8
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- ANONYCALL: Enabling Native Private Calling in Mobile NetworksHexuan Yu, Chaoyu Zhang, Yang Xiao, Angelos D. Keromytis et al.NDSS 2026
- LPG: Raise Your Location Privacy Game in Direct-to-Cell LEO Satellite NetworksQuan Shi, Liying Wang, Prosanta Gope, Qi Liang et al.USENIX Security 2026
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- An Empirical Analysis of Anonymity in ZcashGeorge Kappos, Haaroon Yousaf, Mary Maller, Sarah MeiklejohnUSENIX Security 2018 · 171 citations
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