USENIX Security2021Top-tier venue
M2MON: Building an MMIO-based Security Reference Monitor for Unmanned Vehicles
Arslan Khan, Hyungsub Kim, Byoungyoung Lee, Dongyan Xu, Antonio Bianchi, Dave (Jing) Tian
Abstract
Unmanned Vehicles (UVs) often consist of multiple Micro Controller Units (MCUs) as peripherals to interact with the physical world, including GPS sensors, barometers, motors, etc. While the attack vectors for UV vary, a number of UV attacks aim to impact the physical world either from the cyber or the physical space, e.g., hijacking the mission of UVs via malicious ground control commands or GPS spoofing. This provides us an opportunity to build a unified and generic security framework defending against multiple kinds of UV attacks by monitoring the system's I/O activities. Accordingly, we build a security reference monitor for UVs by hooking into the memory-mapped I/O (MMIO), namely M2MON. Instead of building upon existing RTOS, we implement M2MON as a microkernel running in the privileged mode intercepting MMIOs while pushing the RTOS and applications into the unprivileged mode. We further instantiate an MMIO firewall using M2MON and demonstrate how to implement a secure Extended Kalman Filter (EKF) within M2MON. Our evaluation on a real-world UV system shows that M2MON incurs an 8.85% runtime overhead. Furthermore, M2MON-based firewall is able to defend against different cyber and physical attacks. The M2MON microkernel contains less than 4K LoC comparing to the 3M LoC RTOS used in our evaluation. We believe M2MON provides the first step towards building a trusted and practical security reference monitor for UVs.
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Install the CLIlune papers fulltext a366d903-71e4-4718-9c2e-b7726d974d84Cited by top-tier papers5
- Low-Cost Privilege Separation with Compile Time Compartmentalization for Embedded SystemsArslan Khan, Dongyan Xu, Dave Jing TianS&P 2023
- ARI: Attestation of Real-time Mission Execution IntegrityJinwen Wang, Yujie Wang, Ao Li, Yang Xiao et al.USENIX Security 2023
- TZ-DATASHIELD: Automated Data Protection for Embedded Systems via Data-Flow-Based CompartmentalizationZelun Kong, Minkyung Park, Le Guan, Ning Zhang et al.NDSS 2025
- EC: Embedded Systems Compartmentalization via Intra-Kernel IsolationArslan Khan, Dongyan Xu, Dave Jing TianS&P 2023
- Automated Discovery of Semantic Attacks in Multi-Robot Navigation SystemsDoguhan Yeke, Kartik Anand Pant, Muslum Ozgur Ozmen, Hyungsub Kim et al.USENIX Security 2025
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- Fingerprinting Electronic Control Units for Vehicle Intrusion DetectionKyong-Tak Cho, Kang G. ShinUSENIX Security 2016 · 524 citations
- Key Reinstallation Attacks: Forcing Nonce Reuse in WPA2Mathy Vanhoef, Frank PiessensCCS 2017 · 437 citations
- Viden: Attacker Identification on In-Vehicle NetworksKyong-Tak Cho, Kang G. ShinCCS 2017 · 218 citations
- All Your GPS Are Belong To Us: Towards Stealthy Manipulation of Road Navigation SystemsKexiong Curtis Zeng, Shinan Liu, Yuanchao Shu, Dong Wang et al.USENIX Security 2018 · 174 citations
- Securing Real-Time Microcontroller Systems through Customized Memory View SwitchingChung Hwan Kim, Taegyu Kim, Hongjun Choi, Zhongshu Gu et al.NDSS 2018 · 127 citations
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