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USENIX Security2023Top-tier venue

BunnyHop: Exploiting the Instruction Prefetcher

Zhiyuan Zhang, Mingtian Tao, Sioli O'Connell, Chitchanok Chuengsatiansup, Daniel Genkin, Yuval Yarom

Abstract

The instruction prefetcher is a microarchitectural component whose task is to bring program code into the instruction cache. To predict which code is likely to be executed, the instruction prefetcher relies on the branch predictor. In this paper we investigate the instruction prefetcher in modern Intel processors. We first propose BunnyHop, a technique that uses the instruction prefetcher to encode branch prediction information as a cache state. We show how to use BunnyHop to perform low-noise attacks on the branch predictor. Specifically, we show how to implement attacks similar to Flush+Reload and Prime+Probe on the branch predictor instead of on the data caches. We then show that BunnyHop allows using the instruction prefetcher as a confused deputy to force cache eviction within a victim. We use this to demonstrate an attack on an implementation of AES protected with both cache coloring and data prefetch.

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  • LVI: Hijacking Transient Execution through Microarchitectural Load Value Injection cites Inferring Fine-grained Control Flow Inside SGX Enclaves with Branch Shadowing
  • LVI: Hijacking Transient Execution through Microarchitectural Load Value Injection cites Spectre Attacks: Exploiting Speculative Execution
  • LVI: Hijacking Transient Execution through Microarchitectural Load Value Injection cites Meltdown: Reading Kernel Memory from User Space
  • Spectre Attacks: Exploiting Speculative Execution cites Inferring Fine-grained Control Flow Inside SGX Enclaves with Branch Shadowing
  • ShadowLoad: Injecting State into Hardware Prefetchers cites LVI: Hijacking Transient Execution through Microarchitectural Load Value Injection
  • ShadowLoad: Injecting State into Hardware Prefetchers cites Spectre Attacks: Exploiting Speculative Execution
  • ShadowLoad: Injecting State into Hardware Prefetchers cites Meltdown: Reading Kernel Memory from User Space
  • ShadowLoad: Injecting State into Hardware Prefetchers cites FetchBench: Systematic Identification and Characterization of Proprietary Prefetchers
  • Conjuring: Leaking Control Flow via Speculative Fetch Attacks cites Inferring Fine-grained Control Flow Inside SGX Enclaves with Branch Shadowing
  • Conjuring: Leaking Control Flow via Speculative Fetch Attacks cites Spectre Attacks: Exploiting Speculative Execution
  • Conjuring: Leaking Control Flow via Speculative Fetch Attacks cites Translation Leak-aside Buffer: Defeating Cache Side-channel Protections with TLB Attacks
  • Controlled Preemption: Amplifying Side-Channel Attacks from Userspace cites Inferring Fine-grained Control Flow Inside SGX Enclaves with Branch Shadowing
  • Controlled Preemption: Amplifying Side-Channel Attacks from Userspace cites LVI: Hijacking Transient Execution through Microarchitectural Load Value Injection
  • Controlled Preemption: Amplifying Side-Channel Attacks from Userspace cites Translation Leak-aside Buffer: Defeating Cache Side-channel Protections with TLB Attacks
  • Controlled Preemption: Amplifying Side-Channel Attacks from Userspace cites FetchBench: Systematic Identification and Characterization of Proprietary Prefetchers
  • Meltdown: Reading Kernel Memory from User Space cites Spectre Attacks: Exploiting Speculative Execution
  • SpecMPK: Efficient In-Process Isolation with Speculative and Secure Permission Update Instruction cites Spectre Attacks: Exploiting Speculative Execution
  • SpecMPK: Efficient In-Process Isolation with Speculative and Secure Permission Update Instruction cites Meltdown: Reading Kernel Memory from User Space
  • SpecMPK: Efficient In-Process Isolation with Speculative and Secure Permission Update Instruction cites Translation Leak-aside Buffer: Defeating Cache Side-channel Protections with TLB Attacks
  • Translation Leak-aside Buffer: Defeating Cache Side-channel Protections with TLB Attacks cites Inferring Fine-grained Control Flow Inside SGX Enclaves with Branch Shadowing
  • FetchBench: Systematic Identification and Characterization of Proprietary Prefetchers cites Spectre Attacks: Exploiting Speculative Execution
  • FetchBench: Systematic Identification and Characterization of Proprietary Prefetchers cites Meltdown: Reading Kernel Memory from User Space
Builds onCited byLeft to right by year; the more cited, the higher.

Cited by top-tier papers15

  1. FetchBench: Systematic Identification and Characterization of Proprietary PrefetchersTill Schlüter, Amit Choudhari, Lorenz Hetterich, Leon Trampert et al.CCS 2023 · 11 citations
  2. ShadowLoad: Injecting State into Hardware PrefetchersLorenz Hetterich, Fabian Thomas, Lukas Gerlach, Ruiyi Zhang et al.ASPLOS 2025 · 9 citations
  3. Conjuring: Leaking Control Flow via Speculative Fetch AttacksAli Hajiabadi, Trevor E. CarlsonDAC 2024 · 5 citations
  4. Controlled Preemption: Amplifying Side-Channel Attacks from UserspaceYongye Zhu, Boru Chen, Zirui Neil Zhao, Christopher W. FletcherASPLOS 2025 · 5 citations
  5. SpecMPK: Efficient In-Process Isolation with Speculative and Secure Permission Update InstructionDebpratim Adak, Huiyang Zhou, Eric Rotenberg, Amro AwadHPCA 2025 · 3 citations

Builds on33

  1. Spectre Attacks: Exploiting Speculative ExecutionPaul Kocher, Jann Horn, Anders Fogh, Daniel Genkin et al.S&P 2019 · 2,435 citations
  2. Meltdown: Reading Kernel Memory from User SpaceMoritz Lipp, Michael Schwarz, Daniel Gruss, Thomas Prescher et al.USENIX Security 2018 · 1,456 citations
  3. Inferring Fine-grained Control Flow Inside SGX Enclaves with Branch ShadowingSangho Lee, Ming-Wei Shih, Prasun Gera, Taesoo Kim et al.USENIX Security 2017 · 536 citations
  4. Translation Leak-aside Buffer: Defeating Cache Side-channel Protections with TLB AttacksBen Gras, Kaveh Razavi, Herbert Bos, Cristiano GiuffridaUSENIX Security 2018 · 357 citations
  5. LVI: Hijacking Transient Execution through Microarchitectural Load Value InjectionJo Van Bulck, Daniel Moghimi, Michael Schwarz, Moritz Lipp et al.S&P 2020 · 275 citations

Related papers

  1. Unveiling Hardware-based Data Prefetcher, a Hidden Source of Information LeakageYoung-joo Shin, Hyung Chan Kim, Dokeun Kwon, Ji-Hoon Jeong et al.CCS 2018 · 73 citations
  2. Leaky Way: A Conflict-Based Cache Covert Channel Bypassing Set AssociativityYanan Guo, Xin Xin, Youtao Zhang, Jun YangMICRO 2022 · 19 citations
  3. Malicious Management Unit: Why Stopping Cache Attacks in Software is Harder Than You ThinkStephan van Schaik, Cristiano Giuffrida, Herbert Bos, Kaveh RazaviUSENIX Security 2018 · 64 citations
  4. PREFETCHX: Cross-Core Cache-Agnostic Prefetcher-based Side-Channel AttacksYun Chen, Ali Hajiabadi, Lingfeng Pei, Trevor E. CarlsonHPCA 2024 · 15 citations
  5. Augury: Using Data Memory-Dependent Prefetchers to Leak Data at RestJose Rodrigo Sanchez Vicarte, Michael Flanders, Riccardo Paccagnella, Grant Garrett-Grossman et al.S&P 2022 · 66 citations
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