CBD: A Certified Backdoor Detector Based on Local Dominant Probability
Zhen Xiang, Zidi Xiong, Bo Li
Abstract
Backdoor attack is a common threat to deep neural networks. During testing, samples embedded with a backdoor trigger will be misclassified as an adversarial target by a backdoored model, while samples without the backdoor trigger will be correctly classified. In this paper, we present the first certified backdoor detector (CBD), which is based on a novel, adjustable conformal prediction scheme based on our proposed statistic local dominant probability. For any classifier under inspection, CBD provides 1) a detection inference, 2) the condition under which the attacks are guaranteed to be detectable for the same classification domain, and 3) a probabilistic upper bound for the false positive rate. Our theoretical results show that attacks with triggers that are more resilient to test-time noise and have smaller perturbation magnitudes are more likely to be detected with guarantees. Moreover, we conduct extensive experiments on four benchmark datasets considering various backdoor types, such as BadNet, CB, and Blend. CBD achieves comparable or even higher detection accuracy than state-of-the-art detectors, and it in addition provides detection certification. Notably, for backdoor attacks with random perturbation triggers bounded by which achieves more than 90% attack success rate, CBD achieves 100% (98%), 100% (84%), 98% (98%), and 72% (40%) empirical (certified) detection true positive rates on the four benchmark datasets GTSRB, SVHN, CIFAR-10, and TinyImageNet, respectively, with low false positive rates.
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Install the CLIlune papers fulltext 86ff2f53-7d25-4463-8667-55fb3c4e855dCited by top-tier papers6
- BadChain: Backdoor Chain-of-Thought Prompting for Large Language ModelsZhen Xiang, Fengqing Jiang, Zidi Xiong, Bhaskar Ramasubramanian et al.ICLR 2024 · 98 citations
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- Prototype Guided Backdoor Defense via Activation Space ManipulationVenkat Adithya Amula, Sunayana Samavedam, Saurabh Saini, Avani Gupta et al.ICCV 2025 · 2 citations
- Seal Your Backdoor with Variational DefenseIvan Sabolic, Matej Grcic, Sinisa SegvicICCV 2025
Builds on31
- Towards Evaluating the Robustness of Neural NetworksNicholas Carlini, David A. WagnerS&P 2017 · 9,786 citations
- Neural Cleanse: Identifying and Mitigating Backdoor Attacks in Neural NetworksBolun Wang, Yuanshun Yao, Shawn Shan, Huiying Li et al.S&P 2019 · 1,801 citations
- Feature Squeezing: Detecting Adversarial Examples in Deep Neural NetworksWeilin Xu, David Evans, Yanjun QiNDSS 2018 · 1,633 citations
- Trojaning Attack on Neural NetworksYingqi Liu, Shiqing Ma, Yousra Aafer, Wen-Chuan Lee et al.NDSS 2018 · 1,377 citations
- Certified Robustness to Adversarial Examples with Differential PrivacyMathias Lécuyer, Vaggelis Atlidakis, Roxana Geambasu, Daniel Hsu et al.S&P 2019 · 1,022 citations
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