Survivalism: Systematic Analysis of Windows Malware Living-Off-The-Land
Frederick Barr-Smith, Xabier Ugarte-Pedrero, Mariano Graziano, Riccardo Spolaor, Ivan Martinovic
Abstract
As malware detection algorithms and methods become more sophisticated, malware authors adopt equally sophisticated evasion mechanisms to defeat them. Anecdotal evidence claims Living-Off-The-Land (LotL) techniques are one of the major evasion techniques used in many malware attacks. These techniques leverage binaries already present in the system to conduct malicious actions. We present the first large-scale systematic investigation of the use of these techniques by malware on Windows systems. In this paper, we analyse how common the use of these native system binaries is across several malware datasets, containing a total of 31,805,549 samples. We identify an average 9.41% prevalence. Our results show that the use of LotL techniques is prolific, particularly in Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) malware samples where the prevalence is 26.26%, over twice that of commodity malware. To illustrate the evasive potential of LotL techniques, we test the usage of LotL techniques against several fully patched Windows systems in a local sandboxed environment and show that there is a generalised detection gap in 10 of the most popular anti-virus products.
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