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NDSS2026Top-tier venue

Actively Understanding the Dynamics and Risks of the Threat Intelligence Ecosystem

Tillson Galloway, Omar Alrawi, Allen Chang, Athanasios Avgetidis, Manos Antonakakis, Fabian Monrose

Abstract

Despite the billions of dollars invested in the threat intelligence (TI) ecosystem-a globally distributed network of security vendors and altruists who drive critical cybersecurity operations-we lack an understanding of how it functions, including its dynamics and vulnerabilities. To fill that void, we propose a novel measurement framework that tracks binaries as they traverse the ecosystem by monitoring for watermarked network Indicators of Compromise (IoCs). By analyzing each stage of the propagation chain of submitted TI (submission, extraction, sharing, and disruption), we uncover an ecosystem where dissemination almost always leads to the disruption of threats, but vendors who selectively share the TI they extract limit the ecosystem's utility. Further, we find that attempts to curtail threats are often slowed by 'bottleneck' vendors delaying the sharing of TI by hours to days. Critically, we identify several threats to the ecosystem's supply chain, some of which are presently exploited in the wild. Unnecessary active probing by vendors, shallow extraction of dropped files, and easy-to-predict sandbox environment fingerprints all threaten the health of the ecosystem. To address these issues, we provide actionable recommendations for vendors and practitioners that improve the safety of the TI supply chain, including detection signatures for known abuse patterns. We collaborated with vendors through a responsible disclosure process, gaining insight into the operational constraints underlying these weaknesses. Finally, we provide a set of ethical best practices for researchers actively measuring the threat intelligence ecosystem. • RQ1 [Propagation]: How do security vendors differ in their ability to analyze malware and share extracted indicators of compromise (IoCs) across the ecosystem? • RQ2 [Disruption]: How do differences in analysis and sharing affect the speed and effectiveness with which vendors block IoCs or take down (or suspend) infrastructure? • RQ3 [Evasion]: How are adversaries exploiting gaps in analysis, sharing, or disruption, and what strategies can improve the ecosystem's resilience against such evasions? Our study reveals a stratified structure in the TI ecosystem that directly impacts IoC sharing and response times. While sandbox analysis occurs rapidly and is widespread (performed

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  • Beyond the Stars: Multimodal Detection of Scams on GitHub cites Reading the Tea leaves: A Comparative Analysis of Threat Intelligence
  • Reading the Tea leaves: A Comparative Analysis of Threat Intelligence cites Understanding the Mirai Botnet
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Cited by top-tier papers1

  1. Beyond the Stars: Multimodal Detection of Scams on GitHubTillson Galloway, Kevin Valakuzhy, Manos Antonakakis, Fabian MonroseUSENIX Security 2026

Builds on21

  1. Understanding the Mirai BotnetManos Antonakakis, Tim April, Michael D. Bailey, Matt Bernhard et al.USENIX Security 2017 · 2,003 citations
  2. Acing the IOC Game: Toward Automatic Discovery and Analysis of Open-Source Cyber Threat IntelligenceXiaojing Liao, Kan Yuan, XiaoFeng Wang, Zhou Li et al.CCS 2016 · 308 citations
  3. Spotless Sandboxes: Evading Malware Analysis Systems Using Wear-and-Tear ArtifactsNajmeh Miramirkhani, Mahathi Priya Appini, Nick Nikiforakis, Michalis PolychronakisS&P 2017 · 134 citations
  4. Reading the Tea leaves: A Comparative Analysis of Threat IntelligenceVector Guo Li, Matthew Dunn, Paul Pearce, Damon McCoy et al.USENIX Security 2019 · 123 citations
  5. Domain-Z: 28 Registrations Later Measuring the Exploitation of Residual Trust in DomainsChaz Lever, Robert J. Walls, Yacin Nadji, David Dagon et al.S&P 2016 · 76 citations

Related papers

  1. Sharing cyber threat intelligence: Does it really help?Beomjin Jin, Eunsoo Kim, Hyunwoo Lee, Elisa Bertino et al.NDSS 2024
  2. Understanding the Status and Strategies of the Code Signing Abuse EcosystemHanqing Zhao, Yiming Zhang, Lingyun Ying, Mingming Zhang et al.NDSS 2026
  3. FLARE-AI: Flaw Reporting for AIShayne Longpre, Elaine Zhu, Carson Ezell, Avijit Ghosh et al.ICML 2026
  4. "Abuse Risks are Often Inherent to Product Features": Exploring AI Vendors' Bug Bounty and Responsible Disclosure PoliciesYangheran Piao, Jingjie Li, Daniel W. WoodsUSENIX Security 2026 · 1 citation
  5. No One Drinks From the Firehose: How Organizations Filter and Prioritize Vulnerability InformationStephanie de Smale, Rik van Dijk, Xander Bouwman, Jeroen van der Ham et al.S&P 2023
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