Half&Half: Demystifying Intel's Directional Branch Predictors for Fast, Secure Partitioned Execution
Hosein Yavarzadeh, Mohammadkazem Taram, Shravan Narayan, Deian Stefan, Dean M. Tullsen
Abstract
This paper presents Half&Half, a novel software defense against branch-based side-channel attacks. Half&Half isolates the effects of different protection domains on the conditional branch predictors (CBPs) in modern Intel processors. This work presents the first exhaustive analysis of modern conditional branch prediction structures, and reveals for the first time an unknown opportunity to physically partition all CBP structures and completely prevent leakage between two domains using the shared predictor. Half&Half is a software-only solution to branch predictor isolation that requires no changes to the hardware or ISA, and only requires minor modifications to be supported in existing compilers. We implement Half&Half in the LLVM and WebAssembly compilers and show that it incurs an order of magnitude lower overhead compared to the current state-of-the-art branch-based side-channel defenses.
Ask about this paper
Your agent reads all of it.
Lune indexed this paper to the last equation, along with the top-tier papers that cite it. Ask a question and the answer quotes them.
Your agent calls
Luneget_paper_fulltext
Free to start. No credit card required.
Terminal
Install the CLIlune papers fulltext 6037b8b6-ecc0-4599-8967-3080017c2ae5Cited by top-tier papers12
- InSpectre Gadget: Inspecting the Residual Attack Surface of Cross-privilege Spectre v2Sander Wiebing, Alvise de Faveri Tron, Herbert Bos, Cristiano GiuffridaUSENIX Security 2024 · 32 citations
- Indirector: High-Precision Branch Target Injection Attacks Exploiting the Indirect Branch PredictorLuyi Li, Hosein Yavarzadeh, Dean M. TullsenUSENIX Security 2024 · 18 citations
- Dissecting and Modeling the Architecture of Modern GPU CoresRodrigo Huerta, Mojtaba Abaie Shoushtary, José-Lorenzo Cruz, Antonio GonzálezMICRO 2025 · 8 citations
- Conjuring: Leaking Control Flow via Speculative Fetch AttacksAli Hajiabadi, Trevor E. CarlsonDAC 2024 · 5 citations
- SSBench: Automated Characterization of Memory Dependence Predictors on Modern CPUsChang Liu, Yu Jin, Yuchen Fan, Tianrui Xiao et al.ISCA 2026 · 1 citation
Builds on22
- Spectre Attacks: Exploiting Speculative ExecutionPaul Kocher, Jann Horn, Anders Fogh, Daniel Genkin et al.S&P 2019 · 2,435 citations
- Meltdown: Reading Kernel Memory from User SpaceMoritz Lipp, Michael Schwarz, Daniel Gruss, Thomas Prescher et al.USENIX Security 2018 · 1,456 citations
- Inferring Fine-grained Control Flow Inside SGX Enclaves with Branch ShadowingSangho Lee, Ming-Wei Shih, Prasun Gera, Taesoo Kim et al.USENIX Security 2017 · 536 citations
- A Systematic Evaluation of Transient Execution Attacks and DefensesClaudio Canella, Jo Van Bulck, Michael Schwarz, Moritz Lipp et al.USENIX Security 2019 · 442 citations
- RIDL: Rogue In-Flight Data LoadStephan van Schaik, Alyssa Milburn, Sebastian Österlund, Pietro Frigo et al.S&P 2019 · 408 citations
Related papers
- HybCache: Hybrid Side-Channel-Resilient Caches for Trusted Execution EnvironmentsGhada Dessouky, Tommaso Frassetto, Ahmad-Reza SadeghiUSENIX Security 2020
- Breaking the Barrier: Post-Barrier Spectre AttacksJohannes Wikner, Kaveh RazaviS&P 2025
- Branch History Injection: On the Effectiveness of Hardware Mitigations Against Cross-Privilege Spectre-v2 AttacksEnrico Barberis, Pietro Frigo, Marius Muench, Herbert Bos et al.USENIX Security 2022
- Branch Privilege Injection: Compromising Spectre v2 Hardware Mitigations by Exploiting Branch Predictor Race ConditionsSandro Rüegge, Johannes Wikner, Kaveh RazaviUSENIX Security 2025
- New Predictor-Based Attacks in ProcessorsShuwen Deng, Jakub SzeferDAC 2021 · 7 citations
