The File That Contained the Keys Has Been Removed: An Empirical Analysis of Secret Leaks in Cloud Buckets and Responsible Disclosure Outcomes
Soufian El Yadmani, Olga Gadyatskaya, Yury Zhauniarovich
Abstract
With the growing reliance on cloud services for storage and deployment, securing cloud environments has become critically important. Cloud storage solutions like AWS S3, Google Cloud Storage, and Azure Blob Storage are widely used to store vast amounts of data, including sensitive configuration files used in software development. These files often contain secrets such as API keys and credentials. Misconfigured cloud buckets can inadvertently expose these secrets, leading to unauthorized access to services and security breaches. In this work, we explore the issue of secret leaks in files exposed through misconfigured cloud storage. Our analysis covers a variety of file formats frequently used in development and focuses on different secrets that have diverse types of impact as well as the possibility for a non-intrusive validation. By systematically scanning a large collection of publicly acces-sible cloud buckets, we identified 215 instances where sensitive credentials were exposed. These secrets provide unauthorized access to services like databases, cloud infrastructure, and third-party APIs, posing significant security risks. Upon discovering these leaks, we responsibly reported them to the respective organizations and cloud service providers and measured the outcomes of the disclosure process. Our respon-sible disclosure efforts led to the remediation of 95 issues. Twenty organizations directly communicated their actions back to us, promptly addressing the issues, while the remaining fixes were implemented without direct feedback to the disclosers. Our study highlights the global prevalence of secret leaks in cloud storage and emphasizes the varied responses from organizations in mitigating these critical security risks.
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