Side-channel Inference of User Activities in AR/VR Using GPU Profiling
Seonghun Son, Chandrika Mukherjee, Reham Mohamed Aburas, Berk Gülmezoglu, Z. Berkay Celik
Abstract
Over the past decade, AR/VR devices have drastically changed how we interact with the digital world. Users often share sensitive information, such as their location, browsing history, and even financial data, within third-party apps installed on these devices, assuming a secure environment protected from malicious actors. Recent research has revealed that malicious apps can exploit such capabilities and monitor benign apps to track user activities, leveraging fine-grained profiling tools, such as performance counter APIs. However, app-to-app monitoring is not feasible on all AR/VR devices (e.g., Meta Quest), as a concurrent standalone app execution is disabled. In this paper, we present OVRWatcher, a novel side-channel primitive for AR/VR devices that infers user activities by monitoring low-resolution (1Hz) GPU usage via a background script, unlike prior work that relies on high-resolution profiling. OVRWatcher captures correlations between GPU metrics and 3D object interactions under varying speeds, distances, and rendering scenarios, without requiring concurrent app execution, access to application data, or additional SDK installations. We demonstrate the efficacy of OVRWatcher in fingerprinting both standalone AR/VR and WebXR applications. OVRWatcher also distinguishes virtual objects, such as products in immersive shopping apps selected by real users and the number of participants in virtual meetings, thereby revealing users’ product preferences and potentially exposing confidential information from those meetings. OVRWatcher achieves over 99% accuracy in app fingerprinting and over 98% accuracy in object-level inference.
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