Privacy-from-Birth: Protecting Sensed Data from Malicious Sensors with VERSA
Ivan De Oliveira Nunes, Seoyeon Hwang, Sashidhar Jakkamsetti, Gene Tsudik
Abstract
With the growing popularity of the Internet-of-Things (IoT), massive numbers of specialized devices are deployed worldwide, in many everyday settings, including homes, offices, vehicles, public spaces, and factories. Such devices usually perform sensing and/or actuation. Many of them handle sensitive and personal data. If left unprotected, ambient sensing (e.g., of temperature, motion, audio, or video) can leak very private information. At the same time, some IoT devices use low-end computing platforms with few (or no) security features.There are many well-known techniques to secure sensed data, e.g., by authenticating communication end-points, encrypting data before transmission, and obfuscating traffic patterns. Such techniques protect sensed data from external adversaries, while assuming that the sensing device itself is secure. Meanwhile, both the scale and frequency of IoT-focused attacks are growing. This prompts a natural question: how to protect sensed data even if all software on the device is compromised? Ideally, in order to achieve this, sensed data must be protected from its genesis, i.e., from the time when a physical analog quantity is converted into its digital counterpart and becomes accessible to software. We refer to this property as PfB: Privacy-from-Birth.In this work, we formalize PfB and design Verified Remote Sensing Authorization (VERSA) – a provably secure and formally verified architecture guaranteeing that only correct execution of expected and explicitly authorized software can access and manipulate sensing interfaces, specifically, General Purpose Input/Output (GPIO), which is the usual boundary between analog and digital worlds on IoT devices. This guarantee is obtained with minimal hardware support and holds even if all device software is compromised. VERSA ensures that malware can neither gain access to sensed data on the GPIO-mapped memory nor obtain any trace thereof. VERSA formally verified and its open-sourced implementation targets resource-constrained IoT edge devices, commonly used for sensing. Experimental results show that PfB is both achievable and affordable for such devices.
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