MAC Advice for facility location mechanism design
Zohar Barak, Anupam Gupta, Inbal Talgam-Cohen
Abstract
Algorithms with predictions have attracted much attention in the last years across various domains, including variants of facility location, as a way to surpass traditional worst-case analyses. We study the -facility location mechanism design problem, where the agents are strategic and might misreport their location. Unlike previous models, where predictions are for the optimal facility locations, we receive predictions for the locations of each of the agents. However, these predictions are only"mostly"and"approximately"correct (or MAC for short) -- i.e., some -fraction of the predicted locations are allowed to be arbitrarily incorrect, and the remainder of the predictions are allowed to be correct up to an -error. We make no assumption on the independence of the errors. Can such predictions allow us to beat the current best bounds for strategyproof facility location? We show that the -median (geometric median) of a set of points is naturally robust under corruptions, which leads to an algorithm for single-facility location with MAC predictions. We extend the robustness result to a"balanced"variant of the facilities case. Without balancedness, we show that robustness completely breaks down, even for the setting of facilities on a line. For this"unbalanced"setting, we devise a truthful random mechanism that outperforms the best known result of Lu et al. [2010], which does not use predictions. En route, we introduce the problem of"second"facility location (when the first facility's location is already fixed). Our findings on the robustness of the -median and more generally -medians may be of independent interest, as quantitative versions of classic breakdown-point results in robust statistics.
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