Understanding Bounding Functions in Safety-Critical UAV Software
Xiaozhou Liang, John Henry Burns, Joseph Sanchez, Karthik Dantu, Lukasz Ziarek, Yu David Liu
Abstract
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) are an emerging computation platform known for their safety-critical need. In this paper, we conduct an empirical study on a widely used open-source UAV software framework, Paparazzi, with the goal of understanding the safety-critical concerns of UAV software from a bottom-up <i xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">developer-in-the-field</i> perspective. We set our focus on the use of Bounding Functions (BFs), the runtime checks injected by Paparazzi developers on the range of variables. Through an in-depth analysis on BFs in the Paparazzi autopilot software, we found a large number of them (109 instances) are used to bound safety-critical variables essential to the cyber-physical nature of the UAV, such as its thrust, its speed, and its sensor values. The novel contributions of this study are two fold. First, we take a static approach to classify all BF instances, presenting a novel <i xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">datatype-based</i> 5-category taxonomy with fine-grained insight on the role of BFs in ensuring the safety of UAV systems. Second, we dynamically evaluate the impact of the BF uses through a <i xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">differential</i> approach, establishing the UAV behavioral difference with and without BFs. The two-pronged static and dynamic approach together illuminates a rarely studied design space of safety-critical UAV software systems.
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