Forwarding-Loop Attacks in Content Delivery Networks
Jianjun Chen, Xiaofeng Zheng, Hai-Xin Duan, Jinjin Liang, Jian Jiang, Kang Li, Tao Wan, Vern Paxson
Abstract
We describe how malicious customers can attack the availability of Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) by creating forwarding loops inside one CDN or across multiple CDNs. Such forwarding loops cause one request to be processed repeatedly or even indefinitely, resulting in undesired resource consumption and potential Denial-of-Service attacks. To evaluate the practicality of such forwarding-loop attacks, we examined 16 popular CDN providers and found all of them are vulnerable to some form of such attacks. While some CDNs appear to be aware of this threat and have adopted specific forwarding-loop detection mechanisms, we discovered that they can all be bypassed with new attack techniques. Although conceptually simple, a comprehensive defense requires collaboration among all CDNs. Given that hurdle, we also discuss other mitigations that individual CDN can implement immediately. At a higher level, our work underscores the hazards that can arise when a networked system provides users with control over forwarding, particularly in a context that lacks a single point of administrative control. Permission to freely reproduce all or part of this paper for noncommercial purposes is granted provided that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Reproduction for commercial purposes is strictly prohibited without the prior written consent of the Internet Society, the first-named author (for reproduction of an entire paper only), and the author's employer if the paper was prepared within the scope of employment.
Ask about this paper
Your agent reads all of it.
Lune indexed this paper to the last equation, along with the top-tier papers that cite it. Ask a question and the answer quotes them.
Your agent calls
Luneget_paper_fulltext
Free to start. No credit card required.
Terminal
Install the CLIlune papers fulltext 417398dd-dfef-4dc9-b0b8-2f405693492aCited by top-tier papers12
- Host of Troubles: Multiple Host Ambiguities in HTTP ImplementationsJianjun Chen, Jian Jiang, Hai-Xin Duan, Nicholas Weaver et al.CCS 2016 · 49 citations
- End-Users Get Maneuvered: Empirical Analysis of Redirection Hijacking in Content Delivery NetworksShuai Hao, Yubao Zhang, Haining Wang, Angelos StavrouUSENIX Security 2018 · 37 citations
- Break the Wall from Bottom: Automated Discovery of Protocol-Level Evasion Vulnerabilities in Web Application FirewallsQi Wang, Jianjun Chen, Zheyu Jiang, Run Guo et al.S&P 2024 · 11 citations
- CDN Cannon: Exploiting CDN Back-to-Origin Strategies for Amplification AttacksZiyu Lin, Zhiwei Lin, Ximeng Liu, Jianjun Chen et al.USENIX Security 2024 · 5 citations
- AquaSonic: Acoustic Manipulation of Underwater Data Center Operations and Resource ManagementJennifer Sheldon, Weidong Zhu, Adnan Abdullah, Sri Hrushikesh Varma Bhupathiraju et al.S&P 2024 · 5 citations
Related papers
- Temporal CDN-Convex Lens: A CDN-Assisted Practical Pulsing DDoS AttackRun Guo, Jianjun Chen, Yihang Wang, Keran Mu et al.USENIX Security 2023
- CDN Judo: Breaking the CDN DoS Protection with ItselfRun Guo, Weizhong Li, Baojun Liu, Shuang Hao et al.NDSS 2020
- Loopy Hell(ow): Infinite Traffic Loops at the Application LayerYepeng Pan, Anna Ascheman, Christian RossowUSENIX Security 2024 · 4 citations
- Discovering and Measuring CDNs Prone to Domain FrontingKarthika Subramani, Roberto Perdisci, Pierros-Christos Skafidas, Manos AntonakakisWWW 2024 · 5 citations
- Poison Over Troubled Forwarders: A Cache Poisoning Attack Targeting DNS Forwarding DevicesXiaofeng Zheng, Chaoyi Lu, Jian Peng, Qiushi Yang et al.USENIX Security 2020
