PanoptiChrome: A Modern In-browser Taint Analysis Framework
Rahul Kanyal, Smruti R. Sarangi
Abstract
Taint tracking in web browsers is a problem of profound interest because it allows developers to accurately understand the flow of sensitive data across JavaScript (JS) functions. Modern websites load JS functions from either the web server or other third-party sites, hence this problem has acquired a much more complex and pernicious dimension. Sadly, for the latest version of the Chromium browser (used by 75% of users), there is no dynamic taint propagation engine primarily because it is incredibly complex to build one. The nearest contending work in this space was published in 2018 for version 57; at the time of writing, we are at Chromium version 117, and the current version is very different from the 2018 version. We outline the details of a multi-year effort in this paper that led to PanoptiChrome, which accurately tracks information flow across an arbitrary number of sources and sinks and is, to a large extent, portable across platforms. As an example use case of the platform, we experimentally show that we can discover fingerprinting APIs that can uniquely identify the browser and sometimes the user, which are missed by stateof-the-art tools, owing to our comprehensive dynamic analysis methodology. For the top 20,000 most popular websites, we discovered a total of 362 APIs that have the potential to be used for fingerprinting -out of these, 208 APIs were previously not reported by state-of-the-art tools. CCS CONCEPTS • Security and privacy → Browser security; Information flow control.
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