SIGuard: Guarding Secure Inference with Post Data Privacy
Xinqian Wang, Xiaoning Liu, Shangqi Lai, Xun Yi, Xingliang Yuan
Abstract
—Secure inference is designed to enable encrypted machine learning model prediction over encrypted data. It will ease privacy concerns when models are deployed in Machine Learning as a Service (MLaaS). For efficiency, most of recent secure inference protocols are constructed using secure multi-party computation (MPC) techniques. They can ensure that MLaaS computes inference without knowing the inputs of users and model owners. However, MPC-based protocols do not hide information revealed from their output. In the context of secure inference, prediction outputs (i.e., inference results of encrypted user inputs) are revealed to the users. As a result, adversaries can compromise output privacy of secure inference, i.e., launching Membership Inference Attacks (MIAs) by querying encrypted models, just like MIAs in plaintext inference. We observe that MPC-based secure inference often yields perturbed predictions due to approximations of nonlinear functions like softmax compared to its plaintext version on identical user inputs. Thus, we evaluate whether or not MIAs can still exploit such perturbed predictions on known secure inference protocols. Our results show that secure inference remains vulnerable to MIAs. The adversary can steal membership information with high successful rates comparable to plaintext MIAs. To tackle this open challenge, we propose SIGuard , a framework to guard the output privacy of secure inference from being exploited by MIAs. SIGuard ’s protocol can seamlessly be integrated into existing MPC-based secure inference protocols without intruding on their computation. It proceeds with encrypted predictions outputted from secure inference, and then crafts noise for perturbing encrypted predictions without compromising inference accuracy; only the perturbed predictions are revealed to users at the end of protocol execution. SIGuard achieves stringent privacy guarantees via a co-design of MPC techniques and machine learning. We further conduct comprehensive evaluations to find the optimal hyper-parameters for balanced efficiency and defense effectiveness against MIAs. Together, our evaluation shows SIGuard effectively
Ask about this paper
Your agent reads all of it.
Lune indexed this paper to the last equation, along with the top-tier papers that cite it. Ask a question and the answer quotes them.
Your agent calls
Luneget_paper_fulltext
Free to start. No credit card required.
Terminal
Install the CLIlune papers fulltext 3971af91-2ed3-47cd-8f65-45a9c9d20592Builds on40
- Deep Learning with Differential PrivacyMartín Abadi, Andy Chu, Ian J. Goodfellow, H. Brendan McMahan et al.CCS 2016 · 7,620 citations
- Membership Inference Attacks Against Machine Learning ModelsReza Shokri, Marco Stronati, Congzheng Song, Vitaly ShmatikovS&P 2017 · 5,137 citations
- ML-Leaks: Model and Data Independent Membership Inference Attacks and Defenses on Machine Learning ModelsAhmed Salem, Yang Zhang, Mathias Humbert, Pascal Berrang et al.NDSS 2019 · 1,141 citations
- Membership Inference Attacks From First PrinciplesNicholas Carlini, Steve Chien, Milad Nasr, Shuang Song et al.S&P 2022 · 1,049 citations
- ABY3: A Mixed Protocol Framework for Machine LearningPayman Mohassel, Peter RindalCCS 2018 · 898 citations
Related papers
- MemGuard: Defending against Black-Box Membership Inference Attacks via Adversarial ExamplesJinyuan Jia, Ahmed Salem, Michael Backes, Yang Zhang et al.CCS 2019 · 464 citations
- MI: Multi-modal Models Membership InferencePingyi Hu, Zihan Wang, Ruoxi Sun, Hu Wang et al.NeurIPS 2022 · 39 citations
- Overconfidence is a Dangerous Thing: Mitigating Membership Inference Attacks by Enforcing Less Confident PredictionZitao Chen, Karthik PattabiramanNDSS 2024
- Privacy Risks of Securing Machine Learning Models against Adversarial ExamplesLiwei Song, Reza Shokri, Prateek MittalCCS 2019 · 293 citations
- ModelGuard: Information-Theoretic Defense Against Model Extraction AttacksMinxue Tang, Anna Dai, Louis DiValentin, Aolin Ding et al.USENIX Security 2024 · 28 citations
