Message Time of Arrival Codes: A Fundamental Primitive for Secure Distance Measurement
Patrick Leu, Mridula Singh, Marc Roeschlin, Kenneth G. Paterson, Srdjan Capkun
Abstract
Secure distance measurement and therefore secure Time-of-Arrival (ToA) measurement is critical for applications such as contactless payments, passive-keyless entry and start systems, and navigation systems. This paper initiates the study of Message Time of Arrival Codes (MTACs) and their security. MTACs represent a core primitive in the construction of systems for secure ToA measurement. By surfacing MTACs in this way, we are able for the first time to formally define the security requirements of physical-layer measures that protect ToA measurement systems against attacks. Our viewpoint also enables us to provide a unified presentation of existing MTACs (such as those proposed in distance-bounding protocols and in a secure distance measurement standard) and to propose basic principles for protecting ToA measurement systems against attacks that remain unaddressed by existing mechanisms. We also use our perspective to systematically explore the tradeoffs between security and performance that apply to all signal modulation techniques enabling ToA measurements.
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Install the CLIlune papers fulltext 1f1e2008-ee7b-424d-9c47-58b1c32a3801Cited by top-tier papers8
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Builds on2
- UWB with Pulse Reordering: Securing Ranging against Relay and Physical-Layer AttacksMridula Singh, Patrick Leu, Srdjan CapkunNDSS 2019 · 57 citations
- UWB-ED: Distance Enlargement Attack Detection in Ultra-WidebandMridula Singh, Patrick Leu, AbdelRahman Abdou, Srdjan CapkunUSENIX Security 2019 · 35 citations
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