Contact Tracing App Privacy: What Data Is Shared By Europe's GAEN Contact Tracing Apps
Douglas J. Leith, Stephen Farrell
Abstract
We describe the data transmitted to backend servers by the contact tracing apps now deployed in Europe with a view to evaluating user privacy. These apps consist of two separate components: a "client" app managed by the national public health authority and the Google/Apple Exposure Notification (GAEN) service, that on Android devices is managed by Google and is part of Google Play Services. We find that the health authority client apps are generally well behaved from a privacy point of view, although the privacy of the Irish, Polish, Danish and Latvian apps could be improved. In marked contrast, we find that the Google Play Services component of these apps is problematic from a privacy viewpoint. Even when minimally configured, Google Play Services still contacts Google servers roughly every 20 minutes, potentially allowing location tracking via IP address. In addition, the phone IMEI, hardware serial number, SIM serial number and IMSI, handset phone number etc are shared with Google, together with detailed data on phone activity. This data collection is enabled simply by enabling Google Play Services, even when all other Google services and settings are disabled, and so is unavoidable for users of GAEN-based contact tracing apps on Android.
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