TraceRouter: Robust Safety for Large Foundation Models via Path-Level Intervention

Despite their capabilities, large foundation models (LFMs) remain susceptible to adversarial manipulation. Current defenses predominantly rely on the ``locality hypothesis", suppressing isolated neurons or features. However, harmful semantics act as distributed, cross-layer circuits, rendering such localized interventions brittle and detrimental to utility. To bridge this gap, we propose TraceRouter, a path-level framework that traces and disconnects the causal propagation circuits of illicit semantics. TraceRouter operates in three stages: (1) it pinpoints a sensitive onset layer by analyzing attention divergence; (2) it leverages sparse autoencoders (SAEs) and differential activation analysis to disentangle and isolate malicious features; and (3) it maps these features to downstream causal pathways via feature influence scores (FIS) derived from zero-out interventions. By selectively suppressing these causal chains, TraceRouter physically severs the flow of harmful information while leaving orthogonal computation routes intact. Extensive experiments demonstrate that TraceRouter significantly outperforms state-of-the-art baselines, achieving a superior trade-off between adversarial robustness and general utility. Our code will be publicly released. WARNING: This paper contains unsafe model responses.