Data Recovery on Encrypted Databases with k-Nearest Neighbor Query Leakage
Evgenios M. Kornaropoulos, Charalampos Papamanthou, Roberto Tamassia
摘要
Recent works by Kellaris et al. (CCS'16) and Lacharite et al. (SP'18) demonstrated attacks of data recovery for encrypted databases that support rich queries such as range queries. In this paper, we develop the first data recovery attacks on encrypted databases supporting one-dimensional k-nearest neighbor (k-NN) queries, which are widely used in spatial data management. Our attacks exploit a generic k-NN query leakage profile: the attacker observes the identifiers of matched records. We consider both unordered responses, where the leakage is a set, and ordered responses, where the leakage is a k-tuple ordered by distance from the query point. As a first step, we perform a theoretical feasibility study on exact reconstruction, i.e., recovery of the exact plaintext values of the encrypted database. For ordered responses, we show that exact reconstruction is feasible if the attacker has additional access to some auxiliary information that is normally not available in practice. For unordered responses, we prove that exact reconstruction is impossible due to the infinite number of valid reconstructions. As a next step, we propose practical and more realistic approximate reconstruction attacks so as to recover an approximation of the plaintext values. For ordered responses, we show that after observing enough query responses, the attacker can approximate the client's encrypted database with considerable accuracy. For unordered responses we characterize the set of valid reconstructions as a convex polytope in a k-dimensional space and present a rigorous attack that reconstructs the plaintext database with bounded approximation error. As multidimensional spatial data can be efficiently processed by mapping it to one dimension via Hilbert curves, we demonstrate our approximate reconstruction attacks on privacy-sensitive geolocation data. Our experiments on real-world datasets show that our attacks reconstruct the plaintext values with relative error ranging from 2.9% to 0.003%.
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引用它的顶会 Paper23
- Learning to Reconstruct: Statistical Learning Theory and Encrypted Database AttacksPaul Grubbs, Marie-Sarah Lacharité, Brice Minaud, Kenneth G. PatersonS&P 2019 · 被引用 146 次
- The State of the Uniform: Attacks on Encrypted Databases Beyond the Uniform Query DistributionEvgenios M. Kornaropoulos, Charalampos Papamanthou, Roberto TamassiaS&P 2020 · 被引用 104 次
- Response-Hiding Encrypted Ranges: Revisiting Security via Parametrized Leakage-Abuse AttacksEvgenios M. Kornaropoulos, Charalampos Papamanthou, Roberto TamassiaS&P 2021 · 被引用 56 次
- Leakage-Abuse Attacks Against Forward and Backward Private Searchable Symmetric EncryptionLei Xu, Leqian Zheng, Chengzhi Xu, Xingliang Yuan 等CCS 2023 · 被引用 28 次
- Snoopy: Surpassing the Scalability Bottleneck of Oblivious StorageEmma Dauterman, Vivian Fang, Ioannis Demertzis, Natacha Crooks 等SOSP 2021 · 被引用 26 次
它引用的顶会 Paper8
- All Your Queries Are Belong to Us: The Power of File-Injection Attacks on Searchable EncryptionYupeng Zhang, Jonathan Katz, Charalampos PapamanthouUSENIX Security 2016 · 被引用 512 次
- ∑oφoς: Forward Secure Searchable EncryptionRaphael BostCCS 2016 · 被引用 382 次
- Generic Attacks on Secure Outsourced DatabasesGeorgios Kellaris, George Kollios, Kobbi Nissim, Adam O'NeillCCS 2016 · 被引用 327 次
- Leakage-Abuse Attacks against Order-Revealing EncryptionPaul Grubbs, Kevin Sekniqi, Vincent Bindschaedler, Muhammad Naveed 等S&P 2017 · 被引用 204 次
- Order-Revealing Encryption: New Constructions, Applications, and Lower BoundsKevin Lewi, David J. WuCCS 2016 · 被引用 200 次
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