TickTock: Detecting Microphone Status in Laptops Leveraging Electromagnetic Leakage of Clock Signals
Soundarya Ramesh, Ghozali Suhariyanto Hadi, Sihun Yang, Mun Choon Chan, Jun Han
摘要
We are witnessing a heightened surge in remote privacy attacks on laptop computers. These attacks often exploit malware to remotely gain access to webcams and microphones in order to spy on the victim users. While webcam attacks are somewhat defended with widely available commercial webcam privacy covers, unfortunately, there are no adequate solutions to thwart the attacks on mics despite recent industry efforts. As a first step towards defending against such attacks on laptop mics, we propose TickTock, a novel mic on/off status detection system. To achieve this, TickTock externally probes the electromagnetic (EM) emanations that stem from the connectors and cables of the laptop circuitry carrying mic clock signals. This is possible because the mic clock signals are only input during the mic recording state, causing resulting emanations. We design and implement a proof-of-concept system to demonstrate TickTock's feasibility. Furthermore, we comprehensively evaluate TickTock on a total of 30 popular laptops executing a variety of applications to successfully detect mic status in 27 laptops. Of these, TickTock consistently identifies mic recording with high true positive and negative rates. * This is an extended version of the conference paper in the proceedings of ACM CCS 2022 with the same title. Lenovo Outlet Laptops shipped together with TickTock TickTock Server … Identified Mic Clock Freq Sticker Marking Leakage Location (a) (b) (c) (d) … … … 2 MHz 2 MHz … 2 MHz 2 MHz 3 MHz Figure 3: Bootstrapping scenarios -(a) depicts bootstrapping performed by laptop manufacturers, e.g., Lenovo, who subsequently ship laptops with stickers denoting leakage location, 𝑙 mic , and an accompanying TickTock device set to detect mic clock frequency, 𝑓 mic . (b) depicts a crowd-sourcing scenario where users upload 𝑓 mic , along with an image of 𝑙 mic to TickTock's public server. (c) depicts a scenario where a user locally performs bootstrapping. (d) depicts a deployment scenario, where a user deploys TickTock to detect mic on/off status by placing the TickTock device at the location of the sticker, and by setting the TickTock device to detect 𝑓 mic .
问问这篇 Paper
智能体会读完全文。
Lune 把这篇 Paper 索引到了每一个公式,引用它的顶会 Paper 也一样。你提问,回答直接引用原文。
引用它的顶会 Paper5
- MagTracer: Detecting GPU Cryptojacking Attacks via Magnetic Leakage SignalsRui Xiao, Tianyu Li, Soundarya Ramesh, Jun Han 等MobiCom 2023 · 被引用 20 次
- Peering Inside the Black-Box: Long-Range and Scalable Model Architecture Snooping via GPU Electromagnetic Side-ChannelRui Xiao, Sibo Feng, Soundarya Ramesh, Jun Han 等NDSS 2026 · 被引用 3 次
- SoK: Understanding the Fundamentals and Implications of Sensor Out-of-band VulnerabilitiesShilin Xiao, Wenjun Zhu, Yan Jiang, Kai Wang 等NDSS 2026 · 被引用 3 次
- GPSBuster: Busting out Hidden GPS Trackers via MSoC Electromagnetic RadiationsYue Li, Zhenxiong Yan, Wenqiang Jin, Zhenyu Ning 等CCS 2024 · 被引用 2 次
- Sound of Interference: Electromagnetic Eavesdropping Attack on Digital Microphones Using Pulse Density ModulationArifu Onishi, S. Hrushikesh Bhupathiraju, Rishikesh Bhatt, Sara Rampazzi 等USENIX Security 2025
它引用的顶会 Paper7
- Screaming Channels: When Electromagnetic Side Channels Meet Radio TransceiversGiovanni Camurati, Sebastian Poeplau, Marius Muench, Tom Hayes 等CCS 2018 · 被引用 186 次
- Wearable Microphone JammingYuxin Chen, Huiying Li, Shan-Yuan Teng, Steven Nagels 等CHI 2020 · 被引用 62 次
- USB Snooping Made Easy: Crosstalk Leakage Attacks on USB HubsYang Su, Daniel Genkin, Damith Chinthana Ranasinghe, Yuval YaromUSENIX Security 2017 · 被引用 41 次
- Periscope: A Keystroke Inference Attack Using Human Coupled Electromagnetic EmanationsWenqiang Jin, Srinivasan Murali, Huadi Zhu, Ming LiCCS 2021 · 被引用 34 次
- TEMPEST Comeback: A Realistic Audio Eavesdropping Threat on Mixed-signal SoCsJieun Choi, Hae-Yong Yang, Dong-Ho ChoCCS 2020 · 被引用 33 次
相关 Paper
- Sniffing Location Privacy of Video Conference Users Using Free Audio ChannelsLong Huang, Chen WangS&P 2025
- Lend Me Your Ear: Passive Remote Physical Side Channels on PCsDaniel Genkin, Noam Nissan, Roei Schuster, Eran TromerUSENIX Security 2022
- mmEcho: A mmWave-based Acoustic Eavesdropping MethodPengfei Hu, Wenhao Li, Riccardo Spolaor, Xiuzhen ChengS&P 2023
- DeHiREC: Detecting Hidden Voice Recorders via ADC Electromagnetic RadiationRuochen Zhou, Xiaoyu Ji, Chen Yan, Yi-Chao Chen 等S&P 2023
- LAM-assisted Acoustic Eavesdropping in Multi-speaker Scenarios via Commercial mmWave RadarGuodong Liu, Lei Wang, Minjun Jiang, Qianran Qiao 等UbiComp 2026
