RadKey: An LLM-Guided RF Backscatter System for Through-Wall Keystroke Inference
Qijun Wang, Chunqi Qian, Huacheng Zeng
摘要
In today's digitally connected world, keyboards remain the primary interface for inputting sensitive information, making them a persistent target for eavesdropping attacks. While prior keystroke inference techniques have exploited side-channel signals such as acoustics and vibrations, they typically rely on conspicuous, short-range sensors and require victim-specific data for model training, limiting their practicality, scalability, and stealth. In this paper, we present RadKey, an RF backscatter system for covert, long-range, through-wall keystroke eavesdropping. RadKey comprises two components: a compact batteryless backscatter tag and an RF reader. The tag captures keystroke-induced vibrations and acoustic signals, modulating them onto the frequency shift of its backscattered RF signal using two magnetically-coupled LC resonators. This design also enables spectral separation between the excitation and backscatter signals, mitigating self-interference for the RF reader and thus extending eavesdropping range. The RF reader demodulates the backscattered RF signal to infer typed content. It employs a dedicated signal processing pipeline that extracts user- and keyboard-independent keystroke features across time and frequency domains, enabling strong generalizability. To further enhance adaptability, RadKey integrates an LLM for online adaptation, leveraging LLM outputs as pseudo ground-truth labels to refine the classifier during runtime. We have built a prototype of the full RadKey system and evaluated it through extensive over-the-air experiments. Results show that RadKey achieves accurate and robust keystroke inference across diverse users in real-world settings. A demo video is available at: https://radkey-submission.github.io/RadKey/
问问这篇 Paper
智能体会读完全文。
Lune 把这篇 Paper 索引到了每一个公式,引用它的顶会 Paper 也一样。你提问,回答直接引用原文。
它引用的顶会 Paper20
- CoAtNet: Marrying Convolution and Attention for All Data SizesZihang Dai, Hanxiao Liu, Quoc V. Le, Mingxing TanNeurIPS 2021 · 被引用 1,747 次
- SoK: Keylogging Side ChannelsJohn V. MonacoS&P 2018 · 被引用 56 次
- No Training Hurdles: Fast Training-Agnostic Attacks to Infer Your TypingSong Fang, Ian D. Markwood, Yao Liu, Shangqing Zhao 等CCS 2018 · 被引用 46 次
- MARS: Nano-Power Battery-free Wireless Interfaces for Touch, Swipe and Speech InputNivedita Arora, Ali Mirzazadeh, Injoo Moon, Charles Ramey 等UIST 2021 · 被引用 42 次
- Graphics Peeping Unit: Exploiting EM Side-Channel Information of GPUs to Eavesdrop on Your NeighborsZihao Zhan, Zhenkai Zhang, Sisheng Liang, Fan Yao 等S&P 2022 · 被引用 41 次
相关 Paper
- RadEar: A Self-Supervised RF Backscatter System for Voice Eavesdropping and SeparationQijun Wang, Peihao Yan, Chunqi Qian, Huacheng ZengINFOCOM 2026 · 被引用 2 次
- TagStroke: Stealthy Keystroke Inference via Passive RFID Arrays Beneath KeyboardsJiawei Li, Yan Zhang, Dianqi Han, Ang Li 等INFOCOM 2026
- RefleXnoop: Passwords Snooping on NLoS Laptops Leveraging Screen-Induced Sound ReflectionPenghao Wang, Jingzhi Hu, Chao Liu, Jun LuoCCS 2024 · 被引用 5 次
- I Know Your Keyboard Input: A Robust Keystroke Eavesdropper Based-on Acoustic SignalsJia-Xuan Bai, Bin Liu, Luchuan SongACM MM 2021 · 被引用 24 次
- Non-intrusive and Unconstrained Keystroke Inference in VR Platforms via Infrared Side ChannelTao Ni, Yuefeng Du, Qingchuan Zhao, Cong WangNDSS 2025
